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1
成也萧何，败也萧何 (Cheng ye Xiao He, Bai ye Xiao He) is a Chinese idiom
that can be literally translated as “raised up by Xiao He, cast down by Xiao He”
and meaning “success and failure from the same cause”—something broadly akin
to the English idiom “two sides of the same coin.” The Chinese phrase refers to a
tale from the late Qin/early Han dynasty in which Xiao He recommends Han
Xin’s appointment as a general to the future founding emperor of the Han
dynasty, only to later play a central role in Han Xin’s exposure, and downfall, as a
rebel against the Han emperor.
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A NOVEL VIRUS CHALLENGES A REFORMED
REGULATORY SYSTEM
Near the end of 2019, a novel coronavirus began to sicken
residents of Wuhan, a city of more than 11 million and the capital of
China’s Hubei province. 2 The disease caused by the virus, which
would soon be known as COVID-19, spread to other parts of China
and abroad, prompting the World Health Organization (WHO) to
declare a public health emergency of international concern on
January 30, and a global pandemic on March 11, 2020. 3 Despite a
torrent of content on social media (especially WeChat), in Chinese
and foreign media, and from government sources in China and
elsewhere, there is as yet no fully authoritative account of the relevant
actions and omissions at various levels and in multiple units of the
Chinese system of governance. A joint WHO-China mission’s nineday field visit to China in February 2020 offered a laudatory account
of China’s response—one that drew serious and mounting skepticism,
especially as information about early shortcomings in China’s
response to the emergence of COVID-19 became known. 4 Another
2

Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html
[https://perma.cc/U4KK-7BHK]; Archived: WHO Timeline—COVID-19, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/27-042020-who-timeline---covid-19 [https://perma.cc/36YQ-7XWA].
3
WHO Director-General’s Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Jan. 30,
2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statementon-ihr-emergency-committee-on-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)
[https://perma.cc/7J87-5J9W]; WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the
Media Briefing on COVID-19–11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO] (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020
[https://perma.cc/96NA-9BWT].
4
Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID19), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Feb. 16–24, 2020),
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-missionon-covid-19-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L5R-6WH6]; François Godement,
Fighting the Coronavirus Pandemic: China’s Influence at the World Health
Organization, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/23/fighting-coronavirus-pandemic-china-
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WHO mission dispatched to China in July, 2020 to lay the
groundwork for a months-long full investigation of the disease’s
origin held out the possibility of providing additional answers, but
any findings were sure to be controversial and disputed (in part due
to concerns about limited access and charges of bias). 5
Although much, thus, remains to be learned, it is apparent that
the handling of the outbreak in China reflects characteristic
s-influence-at-world-health-organization-pub-81405 [https://perma.cc/J4YWVRGZ]; Emily Rauhala, World Health Organization: China Not Sharing Data on
Coronavirus Infections among Health-Care Workers, WASH. POST (Feb. 26,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/world-healthorganization-china-not-sharing-data-on-health-care-worker-coronavirusinfections/2020/02/26/28064fda-54e4-11ea-80ce-37a8d4266c09_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3H2Y-DD4K].
5
See WHO Experts Travel to China, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO]
(July 7, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/07-07-2020-who-expertsto-travel-to-china [https://perma.cc/CNR9-RDVZ] (describing an investigative
mission undertaken by WHO experts); Emma Farge & Michael Shields, WHO
Says China Team Interviewed Wuhan Scientists over Virus Origins, REUTERS
(Aug. 4, 2020, 6:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronaviruswho/who-says-china-team-interviewed-wuhan-scientists-over-virus-originsidUSKCN2501CE (reporting on interactions between Chinese officials, the
WHO, and scientists in Wuhan); Javier C. Hernández & Amy Qin, China Uses
W.H.O. Inquiry to Tout Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/world/asia/china-coronavirus-who.html
[https://perma.cc/JNV6-NPR7] (describing concerns about access and
objectivity); Christian Shepherd et al., Failure by WHO Team to Visit Wuhan
Sparks Concern over Virus Probe, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/f9dea077-66fb-4734-9d1d-076dc93568e1 (describing
the impact of the WHO visit to Wuhan not occurring); Nick Paton Walsh, The
Wuhan Files, CNN (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/30/asia/wuhanchina-covidintl/index.html?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twCNN&utm_content=202011-30T22:15:04 [https://perma.cc/3WGY-AWV2] (describing limited access of
WHO mission to medical records and data, investigation team’s hope that “a trip
to the field” would be permitted, and mounting international pressure on China to
cooperate with “a World Health Organization inquiry into the origins of the
virus”).
Skepticism, in advance, toward the WHO’s mission was especially strong from
the Trump administration. See Remarks to the Press, Michael R. Pompeo,
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of State, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press
Availability (July 15, 2020), https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeoat-a-press-availability-9 [https://perma.cc/KDC5-9Y6Y] (asserting that the WHO
will “conduct what I am confident will be a completely, completely whitewashed
investigation”).
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weaknesses and strengths of the Chinese administrative state. These
attributes are shared, to some extent and to varying degrees, by other
states, but China’s versions of these features are distinctive, and they
appear to have affected its handling of the novel coronavirus
pandemic. China could undertake some reforms to reduce the risk
that crises like COVID-19 will recur, but they will be difficult to
adopt or implement.
COVID-19 posed a serious test for a system that China had
reformed to improve its handling of disease outbreaks after the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003. The reforms
had sought to: avoid concealment of early indications of an outbreak
by government officials and others; ensure prompt reporting of
potentially serious infectious disease threats to higher levels of
government, including within the public health bureaucracy; provide
timely and accurate information and warnings of outbreaks and
epidemics to the public; facilitate mobilization of the full range of
state and societal resources necessary to address a public health
emergency; and prevent fragmented, even balkanized, responses by
local officials that impede coherent and coordinated responses. 6
The framework put in place after SARS and before COVID
included numerous legal and regulatory measures.7 Core elements
6

For discussions of the Chinese government’s handling of the SARS epidemic,
see Jacques deLisle, SARS, Greater China, and the Pathologies of Globalization
and Transition, 47 ORBIS 587, 595–601 (2003); Yanzhong Huang, The SARS
Epidemic and Its Aftermath in China: A Political Perspective, in LEARNING FROM
SARS 116, 124–25 (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2004). For a general description
of SARS, see SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION [WHO], https://www.who.int/ith/diseases/sars/en
[https://perma.cc/X44S-AT2W] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020).
7
For a discussion of the response mechanisms developed by the Chinese
government after the SARS epidemic, see Shen Kui, The Delayed Response in
Wuhan Reveals Legal Holes, REG. REV. (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/04/20/delayed-response-wuhan-reveals-legalholes [https://perma.cc/CWH4-AKWJ]; Steven Lee Myers, China Created a FailSafe System to Track Contagions. It Failed., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/world/asia/coronavirus-china.html
[https://perma.cc/N724-RREA]. See also Weishengbu Guanyu Jibing Yufang
Kongzhi Tixi Jianshe de Ruogan Guiding (卫生部关于疾病预防控制体系建设
的若干规定) [Provisions on the Establishment of the Disease Control and
Prevention System] (promulgated by Ministry of Health, Jan. 5, 2005, effective
Jan. 5, 2005), CLI.4.56620 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Provisions on Disease
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included the Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious
Diseases [Chuanranbing Fangzhi Fa] (“Infectious Disease Law,”
adopted in 1989, revised in 2004 and again in 2013), the Emergency
Response Law [Tufa Shijian Yingdui Fa] (enacted in 2007, and
greatly influenced by the SARS experience a few years earlier), 8 and
an infectious disease outbreak Direct Reporting System [Zhibao
Xitong] to the China Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
(adopted in 2004)).9 These and other law-centered mechanisms are,
of course, only one part of what structured the response to COVID19, but they are important in understanding what happened—for good
and for ill—and why. Laws and regulations are, among other things,
how the state “talks to itself” 10 —a significant channel mechanism
that a regime’s leaders use to communicate with lower-level officials
and structure their incentives. The laws and rules relevant to public
health emergencies, and interactions among them, reflect and
instantiate features of the Chinese administrative state and
governance that significantly influenced China’s successes and
failures in responding to COVID-19.

SYSTEMIC WEAKNESSES AND A DELAYED RESPONSE
The state’s response to COVID-19 was much quicker than its
response to SARS, which entailed a lag of more than two months
between the first known appearance of the novel atypical pneumonia
in southern China in November 2002 and Guangdong provincial
health officials’ initial, albeit limited, public confirmation of the
emerging epidemic, and another two months before the central
government and top leadership openly acknowledged a severe and

Control] (describing the legal regulatory mechanisms for responding to potential
epidemics adopted after SARS).
8
See generally Jacques deLisle, States of Exception in an Exceptional State:
Emergency Powers Law in China, in EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA 342–390
(Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010).
9
Public Health Surveillance and Information Services, CHINESE CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.chinacdc.cn/en/aboutus/orc_9349/
[https://perma.cc/YB28-QPBC] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020).
10
Kim Lane Scheppele, Exceptions that Prove the Rule Embedding Emergency
Government in Everyday Constitutional Life, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (Jeffrey Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010) 129–130.
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ongoing crisis and began earnest efforts to contain the outbreak. 11
The more rapid initial moves to address COVID-19 still were
dangerously delayed, however, and slower than Chinese authorities
had hoped given the reforms adopted after SARS. 12
Although establishing a date when authorities should have
taken major measures to address the serious and highly
communicable new illness is a tricky business, reasons for grave
concern were present weeks before the central government’s decision
in late January 2020 to lock down Wuhan. 13 The first cases of
patients with symptoms of an atypical pneumonia occurred by the
beginning of December 2019 (and perhaps two weeks earlier), with
the first reports reaching Wuhan local disease control and prevention
authorities before the end of the month. By the end of December, Dr.
Li Wenliang’s WeChat messages—including ones relaying
information provided to him by Dr. Ai Fen, the head of the emergency
11

Update 95—SARS: Chronology of a Serial Killer, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION [WHO] (July 4, 2003),
https://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_07_04/en/ [https://perma.cc/ESA9-CGUS];
Elisabeth Rosenthal, The SARS Epidemic: The Path, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/27/world/the-sars-epidemic-the-path-fromchina-s-provinces-a-crafty-germ-breaks-out.html [https://perma.cc/KH8GVHUN].
12
Estimating the costs of delay is very difficult and highly controversial. One
study asserts that a three-week earlier imposition of a lockdown of Wuhan—
which was done on January 23, 2020—could have prevented 95% of the spread,
and a one-week earlier lockdown could have prevented two-thirds of the spread.
See Shengjie Lai et al., Effect of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions for
Containing the COVID-19 Outbreak in China, MEDRXIV (Mar. 13, 2020), at 12–
13, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.03.20029843v3.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WHM-ZTSM].
13
See Chris Buckley & Steven Lee Myers, As New Coronavirus Spread, China’s
Old Habits Delayed Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/01/world/asia/china-coronavirus.html
(describing the lag between emergence of disease and government’s public
acknowledgements, and reasons for that lag); Chaolin Huang et al., Clinical
Features of Patients Infected with 2019 Novel Coronavirus in Wuhan, China, 395
LANCET 497, 500–03 (2020) (describing the seriousness of the disease outbreak
several weeks prior to the shutting down of Wuhan). Yang Hai (杨海), Wuhan
Zaoqi Yiqing Shangbao Weihe Yidu Zhongduan (武汉早期疫情上报为何一度
中断 ) [Why the Early Report of the Epidemic Situation in Wuhan Was
Interrupted], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO (中国青年报) [CHINA YOUTH DAILY]
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/69pdSrjNH_4qN3RrQ-Yk0Q
[https://perma.cc/A9CC-BNK9].
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department of a major Wuhan hospital—reporting multiple cases of
a possibly contagious, SARS-like illness were being widely shared in
Wuhan—so much so that they soon drew the attention of local public
security authorities, who moved to stop their circulation. 14 On
December 31, the NHC and the CDC dispatched the first team of
experts to Wuhan, with two others following on January 8 and
January 18. Also on December 31, China informed the WHO’s
country office about a cluster of cases of “pneumonia of unknown
etiology,” and the Wuhan branch of the NHC began issuing public
warnings about an “unexplained pneumonia” outbreak. 15 On New
Year’s Day, local authorities closed Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood

14

Fighting Covid-19: China in Action, STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. P.R.C. (June
2020), § I (providing detailed official chronology of COVID-19 in China). See
also Coronavirus: What Did China Do About Early Outbreak?, BBC (June 9,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52573137 [https://perma.cc/BVZ5UHYQ] (providing chronology of events and responses in December 2019 to
January 2020); Josephine Ma, Coronavirus: China’s First Confirmed Covid-19
Case Traced Back to November 17, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinasfirst-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back [https://perma.cc/Z7MH-3736]; Gong
Jingqi, Fa Shaozi de Ren (发哨子的人) [The Person Who Handed Out the
Whistle], RENWU (人物) [PEOPLE] (Mar. 10, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/sggfhq8
[https://perma.cc/QRU4-63P2] (describing early warnings sent by Dr. Ai to her
college classmates and colleagues about a SARS-like illness); Lily Kuo,
Coronavirus: Wuhan Doctor Speaks Out Against Authorities, GUARDIAN (Mar.
11, 2020, 4:50 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/coronavirus-wuhan-doctor-aifen-speaks-out-against-authorities [https://perma.cc/63F2-5TFY] (describing Ai’s
warnings, and explaining that Li had spread Ai’s warnings about the disease); He
Warned of Coronavirus. Here’s What He Told Us Before He Died., N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/world/asia/Li-Wenliangchina-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/67WR-FV7G]; Li Wenliang
(@xiaolwl), WEIBO (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://m.weibo.cn/u/1139098205?uid=1139098205&luicode=1
[https://perma.cc/ANQ7-NVHS].
15
Pneumonia of Unknown Cause—China, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO] (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumoniaof-unkown-cause-china/en/ [https://perma.cc/L4QK-52FN]; NHC Take Positive
Actions to Fight New Coronavirus, NAT'L HEALTH COMM'N P.R.C. (Jan. 20,
2020), http://en.nhc.gov.cn/2020-01/20/c_76000.htm; Takeaways From Internal
Documents on China's Virus Response, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/a75e4e452f5a2d0ecaa241ca2045599e.
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Wholesale Market, a suspected source of COVID-19’s crossover into
the human population.16
Before the middle of January (and perhaps as early as very
late December when Dr. Zhang Jixian encountered a cluster of cases
among a family), there appears to have been ample evidence of
transmission of COVID-19 between people, and thus, signs of a
potential epidemic. The risk of a pandemic was underscored by the
first report of a case outside China on January 13, the first report of a
case in China outside of Wuhan on January 19, and the first reported
case of confirmed human-to-human transmission outside of China on
January 24. 17 Serious concern about the atypical pneumonia
outbreak, now identified as caused by a novel coronavirus, had taken
hold among top-level national authorities by the middle of the month.
On January 14, NHC chief Ma Xiaowei held a confidential
teleconference, which was followed by documents issuing detailed
“internal instructions”—directing provincial officials to prepare to
respond to an epidemic and telling health commissions in Wuhan and
Hubei to strengthen monitoring, social management and other
measures to control the spread of the novel illness.18 The CDC set up

16

For a discussion of the causes of Coronavirus and of the potential link between
Coronavirus and “wet markets,” see Dina Fine Maron, ‘Wet Markets’ Likely
Launched the Coronavirus, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2020/04/coronavirus-linked-tochinese-wet-markets; Wuhan Seafood Market May Not Be Only Source of Novel
Coronavirus: Expert, XINHUA (Jan. 29, 2020, 12:49 PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/29/c_138741063.htm
[https://perma.cc/QA9F-58NJ]; Carolyn Kormann, From Bats to Human Lungs,
the Evolution of a Coronavirus, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/from-bats-to-human-lungs-theevolution-of-a-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/Z5F4-9WV6].
17
Novel Coronavirus—Thailand (ex-China), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO] (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.who.int/csr/don/14-january-2020-novelcoronavirus-thailand-ex-china/en/ [https://perma.cc/R5TS-XA7D] (describing
first confirmed case outside China, in Thailand, of a traveler from Wuhan); Novel
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report—4, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO] (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200124-sitrep-4-2019ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=9272d086_8 [https://perma.cc/V98Q-LFJ4] (reporting a case of
apparent human to human transmission in Vietnam).
18
See supra the sources cited in note 15.
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working groups to dispatch resources and gather information to
affected areas.19
But it was not until January 20 that Zhong Nanshan—an 84year-old expert in respiratory diseases who led the third team of
experts sent to Wuhan20 and who had become prominent during the
SARS epidemic for developing treatments and publicly warning
against overly optimistic official statements that the epidemic was

19

See China Didn’t Warn Public of Likely Pandemic for 6 Key Days,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://apnews.com/68a9e1b91de4ffc166acd6012d82c2f9 [https://perma.cc/XJ74H4KG]; China Publishes Timeline on COVID-19 Information Sharing, Int’l
Cooperation, XINHUA (Apr. 6, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202004/06/c_138951662.htm [https://perma.cc/3QTY-SRYV] (tracing the timeline of
COVID-19 and the Chinese government’s responses to the disease and its
spread); Yao Yuan et al., Xinhua Headlines: Chinese Doctor Recalls First
Encounter with Mysterious Virus, XINHUA (Apr. 16, 2020),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/16/c_138982435.htm
[https://perma.cc/P9X8-WTZ2] (describing Dr. Zhang Jixian’s report of suspicion
on December 27 of person-to-person transmission based on a cluster of cases
within a family); Guojia Weisheng Wei Queren Wosheng Shouli Shuruxing
Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu de Feiyan Quezhen Bingli (国家卫生健康委确认我
省首例输入性新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎确诊病例) [National Health
Commission Confirms Our Province’s First Imported Confirmed Case of Novel
Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia], HEALTH COMM'N GUANGDONG PROVINCE
(Jan. 20, 2020), http://wsjkw.gd.gov.cn/zwyw_yqxx/content/post_2876057.html
[https://perma.cc/BPB8-C4VZ]; Guojia Weisheng Jiankang Wei Zhaokai
Quanguo Dianshi Dianhua Huiyi Bushu Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran
Feiyan Fangkong Gongzuo (国家卫生健康委召开全国电视电话会议部署新型
冠状病毒感染肺炎防控工作) [National Health Commission Held a National
Video Conference to Deploy the Prevention and Control of New Coronavirus
Infection Pneumonia], NAT’L HEALTH COMM’N P.R.C. (Jan. 14, 2020)
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/fkdt/202002/e5e8a132ef8b42d484e6df53d4d110c1.sh
tml (describing Ma Xiaowei’s teleconference on current responses to the noval
Coronavirus and directions for health commissions in Wuhan and Hubei).
20
Biography of the Journal Editor-in-Chief Prof. Dr. Nanshan Zhong, J.
THORACIC DISEASE, http://jtd.amegroups.com/about/editorInChief
[https://perma.cc/9952-NQ3D] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020); All Things
Considered, Meet Dr. Zhong Nanshan, The Public Face of the COVID-19 Fight in
China, NPR (Apr. 15, 2020, 4:18 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/15/835308147/meet-dr-zhong-nanshan-the-publicface-of-the-covid-19-fight-in-china [https://perma.cc/L4HU-FA6Y] (describing
Dr. Zhong’s role in the Chinese government’s response to COVID-19).
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waning in April 2003 21 —stated publicly that the illness could be
spread from person to person.
Xi Jinping made a public
announcement on the same day, declaring that all Chinese
Communist Party committees and governments at all levels should
take effective measures to address the virus. 22 Authorities declared
the new virus to be subject to the mandatory reporting regime for
“Class B” diseases and directed that the strict disease control and
prevention measures for a “Class A” pathogen (under the Infectious
Disease Law) would be applied.23 For the first time, on January 21,
People’s Daily carried several stories—and gave prominent
coverage—to the outbreak.24
During the six days preceding these announcements, Wuhan
had seen thousands of new cases, city officials had allowed a large
annual community banquet to go forward, and the busy Lunar New
21

Physician Who Played Pivotal Role in Battling SARS Once Again Serves the
People amid New Epidemic, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1179589.shtml [https://perma.cc/45HENY88]; Emily Feng & Amy Cheng, They Call Him a Hero: Dr. Zhong is the
Public Face of China’s War against Coronavirus, NPR (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/02/825957192/dr-zhong-isthe-supreme-commander-in-china-s-war-against-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/THV2-Z2GY].
22
Zhou Chuqing (周楚卿), Xi Jingping Dui Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran
de Feiyan Yiqing Zuochu Zhongyao Zhishi; Qiangdiao Yaoba Renmin Qunzhong
Shengming Anquan He Shenti Jiankang Fangzai Diyiwei; Jianjue Ezhi Yiqing
Manyan Shitou; Li Keqiang Zuochu Pishi (习近平对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎

疫情作出重要指示 强调要把人民群众生命安全和身体健康放在第一位 坚决
遏制疫情蔓延势头 李克强作出批示 [Xi Jinping Issues an Important Instruction
on Novel Coronavirus Infectious Pneumonia Epidemic; Emphasis on the People’s
Lives and Health in the First Place; Resolutely Contain the Epidemic Spread; Li
Keqiang Issues Instructions], XINHUA (Jan. 20, 2020, 7:27 PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-01/20/c_1125486561.htm
[https://perma.cc/EJP9-SUJS].
23
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Weisheng Jiankang Weiyuanhui
Gonggao (中华人民共和国国家卫生健康委员会公告, 2020 年第 1 号)
[Announcement of the National Health Commission of the People's Republic of
China, 2020 No.1], NAT'L HEALTH COMM'N P.R.C. (Jan. 20, 2020),
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/jkj/s7916/202001/44a3b8245e8049d2837a4f27529cd386.
shtml [https://perma.cc/N9YT-LE8M]. See also infra text accompanying note
139.
24
Six Stories on the Novel Coronavirus, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Jan. 21, 2020),
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-01/21/nbs.D110000renmrb_01.htm
[https://perma.cc/32RD-XQH4]. See also infra text accompanying note 139.
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Year travel season had begun.25 On January 23, a directive to lock
down Wuhan was issued, and extraordinarily severe restrictions
followed.26 Travel to and from the city was prohibited. Businesses
were closed. Residents were largely confined to their apartments,
except for very limited forays for medical treatment, with daily
25

See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 19 (detailing the early timeline of COVID19, its spread, and how local and central governments reacted); Chen Chen (陈尘
), Wuhan Wanjia Shipin Liuchu; Zhiqing Ren Zaibao Shijian Neiqing (武汉万家
宴视频流出 知情人再曝事件内情) [Wuhan 10,000 Families Banquet Video
Released: Insiders Retell the Story], JUJIAO WANG (聚焦网) [CBF] (Feb. 14,
2020, 9:38 AM), http://www.cbfau.com/cbf-201585780.html
[https://perma.cc/PWH5-XAG2] (describing that a banquet was held in Baibuting,
Wuhan with more than 40,000 families participating); Liang Shiting (梁施婷),
Wanjiayan 26 Tian Hou, Wuren Zhidao Wuhan Baibuting Xinguan Feiyan
Quezhen Shuliang (万家宴 26 天后，无人知道武汉百步亭新冠肺炎确诊数量)
[26 Days after the 10,000 Families Banquet, Number of Confirmed Cases of
Novel Coronavirus in Baibuting, Wuhan Unknown], SHIDAI CAIJING (时代财经)
[TIME WKLY. FIN.] (Feb. 13, 2020, 8:13 PM),
https://www.sohu.com/a/372824937_237556 [https://perma.cc/4T5R-2DYV]
(reporting that there were no testing of COVID-19 and no control over entrance
into Baibuting).
26
See Wuhan Municipality Novel Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia Epidemic
Prevention and Control Command Center, Wuhan Shi Xinxing Guanzhaung
Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihui Bu Tonggao (Di 1 Hao) (武汉
市新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控指挥部通告（第 1 号）) [Notice from
the Municipal Novel Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia Epidemic Prevention and
Control Command Center (No. 1)], STATE COUNCIL P.R.C. (Jan. 23, 2020),
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-01/23/content_5471751.htm
[https://perma.cc/XA9R-NUFA]; Yao Pan (姚盼), Xiaoqu Weihe Yao Fengbi
Guanli? Zhixing de Zenyang? Jumin Shenghuo Ruhe Baozhang? Jizhe Tanfang
Wuhan Sanzhen Kan Zhixing (小区为何要封闭管理？执行得怎样？居民生活
如何保障？ 记者探访武汉三镇看执行) [Why are Communities Shut
Down? How Effective are the Showdowns? How to Protect the Lives of
Residents? Reporters Visited Three Towns in Wuhan to Examine the
Implementation], HUBEISHENG RENMIN ZHENGFU (湖北省人民政府) [HUBEI
PROVINCIAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T] (Feb. 16, 2020, 11:05 AM),
https://www.hubei.gov.cn/zhuanti/2020/gzxxgzbd/qfqk/202002/t20200216_20388
56.shtml [https://perma.cc/V546-N28H] (reporting, among other resrictions, that
only one exit is left open in a neighborhood with staff watching and recording 24
hours a day); Lily Kuo, Coronavirus: Panic and Anger in Wuhan as China
Orders City into Lockdown, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/23/coronavirus-panic-and-anger-inwuhan-as-china-orders-city-into-lockdown#maincontent [https://perma.cc/CXL2UGPW].
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necessities being brought in by small cohorts authorized to do so.
Similar measures were soon imposed in other emerging hotspots, and
a “Level 1” emergency (the most serious in Chinese law’s 4-level
public health emergency scale) was declared, within days, at
provincial levels throughout the country.27
Pervasive and enduring attributes of Chinese governance—
ones that had been on display in the SARS crisis as well—contributed
to problems in the initial handling of the COVID-19 outbreak. One
set of issues was what analysts call tiao-tiao/kuai-kuai and the

27

See, e.g., Peter Hessler, Life on Lockdown in China, NEW YORKER (Mar. 23,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/30/life-on-lockdown-inchina [https://perma.cc/5MTJ-E7RE]; Emma Graham-Harrison & Lily Kuo,
China’s Coronavirus Lockdown Strategy: Brutal but Effective, GUARDIAN (Mar.
19, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/chinas-coronaviruslockdown-strategy-brutal-but-effective (describing shutdown during the early
spread of the COVID-19); He Miao & Xiao Jinbo (何淼 & 孝金波), Wuhan
Quanshi Xiaoqu Fengbi Guanli Jizhe Tanfang Shequ Ruhe Yankong “Liuliang” (
武汉全市小区封闭管理 记者探访社区如何严控“流量”) [Communities are
Shut Down All Over Wuhan; Reporters Visited Communities to See How to Limit
“Flow” Strictly], RENMIN WANG (人民网) [PEOPLE] (Feb. 12, 2020, 10:51 AM),
http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0212/c431577-31583540.html
[https://perma.cc/3WTK-J5TZ]; Sun Hongyang (孙宏阳), Beijing Daolu Shengji
Keyun Yi Yue Ershiliu Ri Qi Quanbu Tingyun (北京道路省际客运 1 月 26 日起
全部停运) [All Inter-Provincial Passenger Transportation in Beijing to Cease
Service Beginning January 26], CAIXIN (Jan. 25, 2020, 8:17 PM),
https://china.caixin.com/2020-01-25/101508364.html [https://perma.cc/X5QK8HVK] (reporting that all bus in and out Beijing stopped operating since January
26, 2020); FANG FANG, WUHAN DIARY: DISPATCHES FROM A QUARANTINED CITY
(Michael Berry trans., 2020) (describing experience of lockdown and aspects of
lockdown measures in Wuhan); Li Ning (李宁), Quanguo Duoge Shengshi
Xuanbu Zanting Shengji Keyun Banxian (全国多个省市宣布暂停省际客运班线
) [Many Provinces and Cities Across the Country Announced Suspension of InterProvincial Passenger Lines], MINISTRY TRANSP. P.R.C. (Jan. 27, 2020),
http://www.mot.gov.cn/zhuanti/2020chunyun_ZT/gedidongtai/202001/t20200127
_3418635.html [https://perma.cc/BZM5-UT63] (reporting that inter-province
buses stopped operation since January 26, 2020); Updates on Coronavirus
Outbreak (Januay 22–March 9), GLOB. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020).
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1181093.shtml [https://perma.cc/TQ2YF5HF] (reporting that 30 of 31 provincial-level entities had declared Level 1
emergencies by January 25, 2020). Emergency Response Law, infra note 29, art.
42 (concerning the four levels of emergency).
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resulting pattern of “dual rule.”28 Officials at a subnational level with
responsibilities for a field of regulation answer simultaneously to two
masters: “vertically” to their superiors in a functionally defined,
hierarchical bureaucratic structure that reaches up to a ministry in
charge of the same field, or a similar central government entity, in
Beijing (for which the metaphor is tiao—a long, narrow piece); and
“horizontally” to the general-purpose government at the official’s
own level—provincial, municipal, or still-lower (for which the
analogy is kuai—a lump or block).
Sensible rationales support both approaches to governance,
both in general and in the specific context of the means for addressing
outbreaks of contagious diseases that were in place when the COVID19 pandemic began. Key promises of tiao measures include giving
experts—in public health, medicine, and relevant fields of science—
early access to information and greater authority to shape responses
when a serious contagious disease outbreak threatens. Such rules rely
on national public health and medical experts to reach informed and
authoritative judgments, shape policy decisions, and make
announcements promptly. Especially when the danger is, or seems
likely to become, national or international in scope, rules requiring
rapid reporting through specialized channels to top levels can
expedite and inform central-level policy determinations—including
by the nation’s top leadership in serious cases—and adoption of
geographically widespread measures, as well as engagement with
foreign counterparts and relevant international bodies (such as the
WHO).
Rules that emphasize kuai recognize that effective
responses—and, often, effective detection—in cases of potential
epidemics must rely on local officials to monitor developments in
28

See generally Paul E. Schroeder, Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power:
The Case of Hubei and Wuhan, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION
MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 283, 283–307 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M.
Lampton eds., 1992) (discussing dual rule in the context of the “competition for
power between Hubei province and its capital city, Wuhan”); KENNETH
LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS,
STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES 141 (Princeton Univ. Press 1988) (describing tiaotiao, kuai-kuai and “dual rule” in energy sector policymaking in China); Andrew
C. Mertha, China’s “Soft” Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations,
184 CHINA Q. 791, 792–810 (2005) (discussing relations between central and
local government authorities in terms of tiao, kuai, and mechanisms of central
control).
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their regions, guide the work of local branches of the public health
and infectious disease agencies, coordinate across front-line
government units, exercise authority over lower-level officials and
medical service providers under their jurisdiction, and mobilize state
and social resources. 29 Such rules also assign early-stage
responsibility to officials who, in practice and often in principle, will
be held principally accountable for bad outcomes. 30
Either tiao or kuai structures can help to avoid some of the
problems associated with China’s multi-layered bureaucracy. Clear
imposition of responsibility at a particular tier of government (kuai)
can limit opportunities for “passing the buck upward.” Strong
requirements for rapid reporting to central authorities in the relevant
specialized bureaucracy (tiao) can cut through or bypass the delays
that plague comprehensive level-by-level decision-making.
Key elements of the Emergency Response Law principally
focus on kuai—geographic units. The law assigns a leadership role
and primary responsibility for planning, preparing for, detecting,
declaring (at any four levels of severity), informing and warning
about, and responding to public health incidents (and other
emergencies) to the most local-level government with jurisdiction
over the affected area (starting at the county level). Roles and powers
of local government include coordinating across local branches of
specialized government departments (including those focused on
public health and disease control and prevention), ordering
restrictions on social and economic activities, taking other
preventative measures, and mobilizing public and private resources.
This kuai system is tiered, with obligations to report expeditiously to

29

This perspective is amply reflected in the Emergency Response Law. See
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tufa Shijian Yingduifa (中华人民共和国突发事
件应对法) [Emergency Response Law of the People's Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Nov. 1, 2007), art. 44–45, 48–49), CLI.1.96791(EN) (Lawinfochina)
[hereinafter Emergency Response Law] (setting forth powers and duties of local,
geographic unit-based government to coordinate across government departments
at local level and to coordinate responses to public health incidents).
30
See infra the discussion accompanying note 105, concerning firing of officials
for assessed failures in responding to COVID-19 and, earlier, SARS.
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higher-level governments (ordinarily, the next-higher-level
government) when an emergency occurs.31
The Infectious Disease Law includes many kindred
provisions concerning epidemics of serious contagious diseases. It
assigns to the people’s governments at various levels responsibility
for directing the work of prevention of infectious diseases, issuing
timely early warnings concerning outbreaks and possible epidemics
of infectious diseases, and receiving reports of epidemics. Such
reports are received from hospitals and other relevant units within a
jurisdiction under the principle of shudi guanli [local management]
and from the same-governmental-level branch of the principal public
health bureaucracies: the weisheng xingzheng bumen [health
administration department] (that is, the same-level “health
commission” such as the Wuhan Health Commission (WHC) or the
Hubei Health Commission (HHC), and the same-level “disease
control and prevention institutions” such as the local branches of the
CDC). The law also gives people’s governments at various levels
authority—again, in a tiered kuai structure—to address infectious
disease outbreaks in their jurisdictions by imposing isolation or
quarantine measures (which must be reported to the next-higher-level
government), ordering shutdowns of economic and social activities
and other emergency measures (with approval from the next-higherlevel government), suspending transportation (in order to check the
spread of an outbreak), and declaring an “epidemic area”—thereby
authorizing an area-wide imposition of the above-described
restrictions (again, with the approval of the next-higher-level
government). The Law also gives governments at various levels
powers to mobilize people and resources to address an epidemic, and
to oversee specialized disease control and prevention institutions at
the same level.32
31

Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 7–9, 12, 17, 20, 25–26, 29, 31–
32, 37–39, 42–45, 48–49, 52–53. See also Tufa Gongong Weisheng Shijian
Yingji Tiaoli (突发公共卫生事件应急条例) [Regulations on Responses to
Public Health Emergencies] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 7, 2003, rev’d
Jan. 8, 2011, effective Jan. 8, 2011), art. 4, CLI.2.174915 (EN) (Lawinfochina)
[hereinafter Regulations on Responses] (directing the people’s government at
relevant level to establish ad hoc headquarters/command bodies and act as the
principal director of response to emergency).
32
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chuanranbing Fangzhifa (中华人民共和国传
染病防治法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Prevention and
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Other elements in the relevant legal and regulatory structure
emphasize tiao. The Emergency Response Law includes such
elements as: tasking departments under the State Council, including
the NHC, with developing emergency response plans and structures
and establishing criteria for each of the four levels of emergencies
(including public health emergencies); directing that when a specific
law or regulation provides that a national-level department under the
State Council, such as the NHC, is responsible for responding to an
emergency, the specific law or regulation governs; and authorizing
relevant departments under the State Council (or the State Council
itself) to take necessary measures when an emergency seriously
affects the national economy.33 Under related regulations on public
health emergencies, the NHC system has the roles of dispatching
experts to assess possible public health emergencies, determining the
category of an emergency within the Class A/B/C categories of
infectious diseases, and informing lower level health commissions
(HCs) of the existence of a public health emergency.34
The Infectious Disease Law, and related regulations and rules,
similarly provide that the NHC, along with local-level HCs, are in
charge of prevention, treatment, supervision and control of infectious
diseases. The Law gives the NHC mandates to monitor and
investigate potential infectious disease epidemics and public health
emergencies, to establish the required means and terms for hospitals
and other units to report on potential epidemics and emergencies, to
receive such reports from those units and state disease control and
prevention organs (the local CDCs), to issue timely warnings about
epidemics and emergencies to other relevant peer institutions, lowerlevel HCs, and lower-level disease control and prevention organs, and
to receive reports on epidemics from lower-level HCs. The Law also
gives the NHC and its subordinate provincial HCs (in some aspects
contingent on NHC authorization) the power and obligation to issue
early warnings and prompt notifications to the public concerning
epidemics.35
Treatment of Infectious Diseases] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Feb. 21, 1989, rev’d June 29, 2013, effective June. 29, 2013), art.
5, 19, 20, 30, 33, 41–45 [hereinafter Infectious Disease Law].
33
Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 7, 17–18, 42, 51.
34
Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 23–30.
35
Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 3–4, 6, 17, 19, 34–35, 38;
Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 25 (concerning the authority of the
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These same laws give the CDC (as the state disease control
and prevention institution) and its provincial and lower-level
branches related powers and functions in addressing potential
outbreaks of infectious diseases, epidemics, and public health
emergencies: monitoring, receiving reports (including from frontline
medical units concerning cases of infectious diseases of uncertain
origin), undertaking analyses, forecasting trends, providing
information platforms, reporting to higher authorities (including to
HCs), and proposing responsive measures. 36 As the foregoing
suggests, the structure contemplated by these tiao-side provisions is
hierarchical and top-down, with the NHC directing and overseeing
provincial and more local-level HCs, and the CDC system, with its
local organs, following a similar arrangement . 37
The Direct Reporting System sought to strengthen the tiao
side. As described by the NHC Director to the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee in 2013, the Direct Reporting System
had “realized real-time direct online reporting of infectious diseases
prescribed by law” in well over 90% of medical institutions at all
levels, with average reporting time to each higher level institution
falling from five days to four hours—an achievement that approached
performance standards set forth in relevant regulations.38
Health Administration Department of the State Council to authorize lower-level
Health Administration Departments to release information concerning
emergencies within their territorial jurisdictions).
36
Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 17–18, 30, 33, 40; Regulations on
Responses, supra note 31, art. 12–15; Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shinjian yu
Chuanranbing Yiqing Jiance Xinxi Baogao Guanli Banfa (突发公共卫生事件与
传染病疫情监测信息报告管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of
Information Reporting on Monitoring Public Health Emergencies and Epidemics
of Infectious Diseases] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Nov. 7, 2003, rev’d Aug. 26, 2006, effective Aug. 26, 2006), art. 8, 24, 29,
[hereinafter Measures for Information Reporting].
37
See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 6, 34–35, 53–58; Regulations
on Responses, supra note 31, art. 4.
38
Guowuyuan Guanyu Chuanranbing Fangzhi Gongzuo he Chuanranbing
Fangzhifa Shishi Qingkuang de Baogao (国务院关于传染病防治工作和传染病
防治法实施情况的报告) [Report of the State Council on Work on Control and
Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Implementation of the Law on Control and
Prevention of Infectious Diseases], NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:04
PM), http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/201308/28/content_1804522.htm [https://perma.cc/P77Z-XKT4] (report by Li Bin,
Director of the National Health and Family Planning Commission); Measures for
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Characteristics of tiao, kuai, and their uneasy coexistence,
impeded the initial response to COVID-19. Although many facts
remain unconfirmed or contested, and we cannot know for sure
individual actors’ motivations, authorities during the initial phase of
COVID-19 acted in ways that were in keeping with the incentives
that this structure of regulation and governance created.
Kuai and Cover-Ups
Actions by Wuhan officials that slowed the response to
COVID-19 reflected risks of mishandling endemic to the kuai side of
China’s Janus-faced structure of governance. These risks primarily
take the form of a “double or nothing bet” that faces local officials.
When encountering a problem of uncertain seriousness (with a novel,
possibly communicable illness being one of many possible examples),
an official can report the emerging issue to superiors. In some cases,
this is mandated by legal or policy requirements (as with the Direct
Reporting System, the Infectious Disease Law, and other relevant law,
in the case of COVID-19). Doing so, however, may have little upside
for the official. It often will not be clear whether the counterfactual—
the outcome to be avoided by proper reporting and the responses such
reporting should trigger—would have been a deadly pandemic, or
merely a fleeting concern (as new infectious diseases often have been
in various parts of China in recent years), the avoidance of which
would not be regarded as a significant accomplishment and the
reporting of which might be seen as an attempt to shirk responsibility
by passing an issue up the chain. 39
Information Reporting, supra note 36, art. 20; Regulations on Responses, supra
note 31, art. 19; Quanguo Buming Yuanyin Feiyan Bingli Jiance Shishi Fangan
(Shixing) (全国不明原因肺炎病例监测实施方案(试行)) [National
Implementation Plan for Surveillance of Pneumonia Cases of Unknown Etiology
(Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Health, July 9, 2004,
effective July 9, 2004), CLI.4.54421 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter National
Implementation Plan] (establishing the procedure for hospitals, local CDCs and
HCs to diagnose, report, and handle pneumonia of unknown etiology).
39
Although SARS and COVID-19 proved to be disastrous pandemics, other
potentially epidemic viruses had been contained in recent years in China without
resort to extraordinary measures. See, e.g., Pengfei Wei et al., Pains and Gains
from China’s Experiences with Emerging Epidemics: From SARS to H7N9, 2016
BIOMED. RSCH. INT’L., 2016, at 1–3,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4971293/
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Moreover, the outcome for an official who does report can be
a good deal worse. If the feared bad-case scenario that seemed to
compel reporting does not materialize (or if responsive measures
addressing a genuine threat are so successful that the seriousness of
the danger is not comprehended), the official may be seen as having
“cried wolf.” A local official’s disclosing to the public, or reporting
to superiors (which can trigger responses that lead to disclosure to the
public), can cause panic in society or lead to state-imposed
restrictions on economically or otherwise important activity. In light
of the resulting public harm caused by such preemptive or responsive
measures, the official may then suffer career-damaging criticism for
overreacting (or for being perceived by superiors as having done so).
On the other side of the bet, an official can try to keep the
facts about a problem that is not yet serious from getting out, hoping
to resolve the matter quietly at the local level and without higher-level
authorities or the public learning about it. But, if the issue proves
unmanageable and becomes known to higher-ups (whether through
official channels, social or traditional media, or whistleblowers), the
official may face significantly graver consequences than if he had
reported promptly. The initially unreported problem may become
more harmful than it would have been if there had been prompt
reporting, or the official’s superiors may perceive that to have been
the case. The responsibility and the risk of adverse consequences
borne by the local official is correspondingly larger. Still worse, in
some cases (including some of those involving outbreaks of
infectious diseases), the official also will have violated policy and
legal requirements to report the emerging problem to higher-level
authorities. The local official’s violation of that bureaucratic
obligation creates an additional basis for career-damaging sanctions,
or worse.
Much that occurred in the initial reaction to the novel
coronavirus is consistent with the logic of this “fess up or cover up”
choice for local officials. Public security authorities in Wuhan
squelched early reporting when they ordered Li Wenliang—along
[https://perma.cc/H8NN-TPNX]; Jennifer Bouey, From SARS To 2019Coronavirus (nCoV): U.S.-China Collaborations on Pandemic Response, RAND
CORP. (Feb. 5, 2020), at 2–12,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT523/RAND_
CT523.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXE4-3DRF].
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with other doctors—to stop “spreading rumors” about the mystery
illness, admonishing Li that his dissemination of “untrue”
information through social media had “severely disrupted social
order” and was “an illegal act,” and requiring Li to pledge
cooperation. Ai’s superiors at her hospital warned her to keep quiet
and cease communicating about cases of the new virus. 40 Reports
from frontline hospital personnel such as Li Wenliang, Ai Fen, and
Zhang Jixian could reach higher-level, state authorities through
proper channels only with the approval of higher-ups at their hospitals,
who did not comply with the Direct Reporting System to the CDC in
December after the first cluster of unexplained pneumonia cases
arrived in their institutions.41 Ai’s hospital, like Li’s, answered to the
WHC. According to one report, doctors at Wuhan hospitals were told
that the WHC had issued a directive not to disclose information about
the virus and the disease. 42 In early to mid-January, local and
provincial health authorities reportedly narrowed the diagnostic
40

Josh Rudolph, Translation: Li Wenliang’s “Admonishment Notice,”
CHINA DIGIT. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/02/translation-li-wenliangsadmonishment-notice/ [https://perma.cc/WF4M-M3TG] (providing
photocopy and translation of the Wuhan Municipal Public Security
Bereau’s Admonishment Notice to Li Wenliang); Amy Cheng, Chinese
Authorities Admit Improper Response to Coronavirus Whistleblower, NPR (Mar.
19, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/03/19/818295972/chinese-authorities-admit-improper-response-tocoronavirus-whistleblower [https://perma.cc/NK42-9XNG]; Kuo, supra note 14;
Huang, supra note 13; Andrew Green, Li Wenliang, Obituary, 395 LANCET 682
(Feb. 29, 2020) https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(20)30382-2/fulltext [https://perma.cc/6JJP-DBWK]; Gong, supra note 14
(concerning Ai Fen); Wei Furong (魏芙蓉) et al., Wuhan Yiqing Chuqi, Wangluo
Zhibao Xitong Weihe Shiling? (武汉疫情初期，网络直报系统为何失灵?) [Why Did
the Direct Network Reporting System Fail at the Beginning of the Wuhan
Epidemic?], PHOENIX NEW MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2020, 9:37 PM),
http://news.ifeng.com/c/7uqH6A5PWt7 [https://perma.cc/7CXF-9XCY]
[hereinafter Wuhan Yiqing] (also concerning Ai Fen).
41
According to one detailed account, there was brief, but quickly suspended, use
of the direct reporting system in early January. See YANG, supra note 13; Wuhan
Yiqing, supra note 40.
42
Kristin Huang, Coronavirus: Wuhan Doctor Says Officials Muzzled Her for
Sharing Report on WeChat, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 11, 2020, 1:38 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074622/coronavirus-wuhandoctor-says-officials-muzzled-her-sharing [https://perma.cc/S6CX-JR8V].
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standards for reporting cases, and required official—and ultimately
HHC—consent for reporting.43
In a move that, perhaps inadvertently, facilitated temporary
concealment from higher-level officials and the public, local
authorities had samples from initial patients sent to labs operated by
companies in other provinces.44 When results indicated a possibly
novel SARS-like coronavirus, the WHC issued two not-publiclydisclosed emergency notices to local medical institutions concerning
prevention and treatment of the pneumonia of unknown etiology.45
According to several accounts, the CDC learned of the outbreak at
the very end of December only from online leaked versions of the
WHC’s pair of emergency notices.46 According to some accounts, an
43

Wuhan Yiqing, supra note 40 (reporting that series of instructions raising the
approval requirements for reporting); Myers, supra note 7 (reporting authorities’
directives to hospitals to seek official approval before reporting cases / using
direct reporting system); Walsh, supra note 5.
44
Gao Yu et al., How Early Signs of the Coronavirus Were Spotted, Spread and
Throttled in China, STRAIT TIMES (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/how-early-signs-of-the-coronaviruswere-spotted-spread-and-throttled-in-china [https://perma.cc/68CM-ZHB7];
Yawen Chen & Cate Cadell, Confusion and Lost Time: How Testing Woes Slowed
China's Coronavirus Response, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-testing-insight/confusion-andlost-time-how-testing-woes-slowed-chinas-coronavirus-responseidUSKBN1ZQ21K [https://perma.cc/6XDM-CLM9].
45
See Wuhan Yiqing, supra note 40. The two documents issues by the WHC
were the “Emergency Notice on Reporting the Treatment of Pneumonia of
Unexplained Cause” and the “Emergency Notice on Doing a Good Job in the
Treatment of Pneumonia of Unexplained Cause.” See Meiguo Guanyu Xinguan
Feiyan Yiqing de Shehua Huangyan yu Shishi Zhenxiang (美国关于新冠肺炎疫
情的涉华谎言与事实真相) [Fact and Fiction About U.S. Lies Concerning China
and the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic], PEOPLE’S DAILY (May 10, 2020),
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/202005/10/nw.D110000renmrb_20200510_1-03.htm [https://perma.cc/X6Y2-GLDT].
46
Dali L. Yang, Wuhan Officials Tried to Cover Up Covid-19—And Sent It
Careening Outward, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2020, 6:43 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/10/wuhan-officials-triedcover-up-covid-19-sent-it-careening-outward/ [https://perma.cc/S7YJ-8NJ3];
Yang, supra note 13; Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Crisis Decision Making—
Managing the COVID-19 Pandemic, Part One: The Domestic Component, CHINA
LEADERSHIP MONITOR (June 1, 2020), https://www.prcleader.org/swaine
[https://perma.cc/Y3AQ-KDAE]; infra text accompanying notes 8–11; Myers,
supra note 7.
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HHC official directed local genomics labs to stop work on samples
of the new virus in early January. 47 On January 12, the Shanghai
laboratory headed by Zhang Yongzhen that had sequenced the novel
coronavirus genome and published its findings was abruptly ordered
to close temporarily.48
When the NHC expert teams (formally sent jointly by the
HHC) reached Wuhan, their access to vital information faced
constraints from local actors.
WHC officials and hospital
administrators steered their visits. They appear to have directed—
successfully—medical staff to withhold information strongly
indicating human-to-human transmission, and blocked access to
formal reports on the discovery of the disease and the results of local
investigations. One member of the second team later complained,
“They didn’t tell us the truth. . . . They were lying. . . . They didn’t
cooperate with us at all.”49 That same team member credited the third
group’s crucial determination that the disease was contagious among
people to its leader Zhong’s expertise and to information from other
localities that had become available by the time of the Zhong group’s
visit.50 Even after the NHC and HHC issued a treatment plan for the
novel illness, the WHC nominally complied but reportedly set—and
communicated to hospitals—strict diagnostic criteria that led to
continued serious understatement of cases. 51
47

Yang, supra note 46; Gao Yu et al., In Depth: How Early Signs of a SARS-Like
Virus Were Spotted, Spread, and Throttled, CAIXIN GLOB. (Feb. 29, 2020)
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-02-29/in-depth-how-early-signs-of-a-sarslike-virus-were-spotted-spread-and-throttled-101521745.html
[https://perma.cc/JJ85-HFR2]; Myers, supra note 7.
48
Zhuang Pinghui, Chinese Laboratory That First Shared Coronavirus Genome
with World Ordered to Close for
‘Rectification,’ Hindering its Covid-19 Research, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(Feb. 28, 2020, 11:00 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3052966/chinese-laboratoryfirst-shared-coronavirus-genome-world-ordered [https://perma.cc/F9XH-ZMXV].
49
Yu Qin & Li Shiyun (俞琴 & 黎诗韵), Zhuanfang Weijianwei Pai Wuhan Di E
r Pi Zhuanjia: Weihe Mei Faxian Ren Chuan Ren? (专访卫健委派武汉第二批专
家:为何没发现人传人？) [Interview of Experts Sent by NHC to Wuhan: Why Wa
sn’t Inter-Personal Transmission Discovered?], SINA (Feb. 26, 2020, 6:28 PM), h
ttps://news.sina.cn/gn/2020-02-26/detail-iimxxstf4577244.d.html?from=wap [http
s://perma.cc/PD6W-KWTA].
50
Id.
51
Yu & Li, supra note 49; Yang, supra note 46; Yang, supra note 13.
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Much of this behavior flouted, or at best skirted, a variety of
legal requirements. These could include obligations of institutions
(such as hospitals) and individuals (including medical staff) to report
on disease outbreaks and potential epidemics (including the
obligations under the Direct Reporting System and the Infections
Disease Law, the Emergency Response Law, and related rules), and
not to make false statements (including to investigating authorities). 52
More broadly, the many investigative, reporting, and informing
missions assigned to health commissions and disease control and
prevention institutions not only imposed affirmative obligations on
such units in Wuhan and Hubei, but also implied duties of local
officials not to impede (and, indeed, to support) the work of those
sent out by higher-level units, including the NHC and the CDC. 53
The familiar “double or nothing bet” or “fess up or cover up”
dilemma of Chinese governance was especially acute for Wuhan
officials dealing with the novel coronavirus because of a few
additional factors that were beyond their control. One was the virus
itself. During the crucial few weeks of delayed response, it very
likely was not clear to local officials that the new pathogen would
prove to be so serious—much more dangerous (particularly in its
propensity to spread rapidly) than SARS, or other, less serious disease
outbreaks that have occurred in various parts of China in recent
memory.
Two other factors were accidents of the calendar. Local
officials made choices that impeded the flow of information to central
authorities and the public on the eve of and during the annual sessions
Wuhan Municipal (January 6–10) and subsequent the Hubei
Provincial (January 12–17) People’s Congress and People’s Political
Consultative Conference (the municipal and provincial legislaturelike organs and united front organs that convene in preparation for
the March plenary meetings of the correlative national bodies in

52

See, e.g., Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 12, 37, 69; Emergency
Response Law, supra note 29, art. 65; Regulations on Responses, supra note 31,
arts. 50–51; Measures for Information Reporting, arts. 10, 16–19; National
Implementation Plan, supra note 38, §§ 2–3, 6.
53
See, e.g., Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts, 18, 48, 65; Emergency
Response Law, supra note 29, art. 65; Regulations on Responses, supra note 31,
arts. 21, 47; Measures for Information Reporting, arts. 21, 34, 39; National
Implementation Plan, supra note 38, §§ 4, 6.
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Beijing),54 and shortly before the January 24th opening of the weeklong national lunar New Year’s holiday (which would bring travel by
millions of people returning home to Wuhan from wherever they
lived and worked in China, or leaving Wuhan to visit family
elsewhere).55 If Wuhan officials were to have taken steps that would
mean the cancellation of the politically high-profile “two meetings”
or the disruption of travel plans for millions of citizens, it would have
been a very big, controversial, and possibly panic-triggering move.
Tellingly, no new cases in Wuhan were publicly reported by official
sources between January 3 and the conclusion of the municipal
meetings.56 On the other hand, not making the outbreak known and
not taking aggressive measures to contain it were risky choices, given
the prospect that failure to act could seed a much more serious and
widespread epidemic and, in turn, cause greater damage to the
economy and public opinion of local government far greater than that
which would have accompanied the suspension of the political
meetings and holiday trips.
Another, broadly kuai-related feature of Chinese governance
deepens the predicament for local officials: what might be called the
“Spider-Man principle”—that “with great power comes great

54

Kyle Jaros, China’s Early COVID-19 Missteps Have an All-Too-Mundane
Explanation, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 9, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/chinasearly-covid-19-struggles-have-an-all-too-mundane-explanation/
[https://perma.cc/5XNX-34PZ]; Qian Gang, Questions for Hubei’s Delegates,
CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/02/10/questions-for-hubeis-delegates/
[https://perma.cc/E6NM-5YUG].
55
Simiao Chen et al., COVID-19 Control in China During Mass Population
Movements at New Year, 395 LANCET 764, 764 (2020); Josephine Ma and Zhang
Pinghui, 5 Million Left Wuhan Before Lockdown, 1,000 New Coronavirus Cases
Expected in City, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 26, 2020, 10:23 p.m.),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3047720/chinese-premier-likeqiang-head-coronavirus-crisis-team-outbreak [https://perma.cc/EQ93-WVJ5].
56
Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, Wuhanshi Weisheng Jiankang Wei
Guanyu Buming Yuanyin de Bingduxing Feiyan Qingkuang Tongbao (武汉市卫
生健康委关于不明原因的病毒性肺炎情况通报) [Wuhan Municipal Health
Commission Bulletin Regarding the Novel Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia
Situation], NAT’L HEALTH COMM’N P.R.C. (Jan. 11, 2020),
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/yqtb/202001/1beb46f061704372b7ca41ef3e682229.sh
tml; SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46354, COVID-19 AND CHINA:
A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (DECEMBER 2019–JANUARY 2020) 9–10, 30 (2020).
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responsibility.” 57 Although four decades of legal and institutional
reforms have brought extensive retrenchment, the party and the state
continue to claim and exert great authority over society, with many
outside analyses concluding that their reach has re-expanded
significantly during Xi Jinping’s tenure. 58 When something goes
awry—whether it is a public health crisis, mass harms due to poor
regulation of tainted food, industrial pollution or construction, or
even problems that may not stem from failures of regulation or
governance—party and state staff and institutions at the relevant level
often are held accountable and suffer the consequences. They face
the risk of being seen as responsible in public perceptions and also in
the judgment of higher-level authorities who “point the spear
downward” to blame lower-tier officials. 59 Those who serve as
government or party chiefs—and thus as local “top leaders”
[yibashou]—for a geographic region are the most vulnerable to this
phenomenon.60
57

Spider-Man: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility (2010–2011),
MARVEL, https://www.marvel.com/comics/series/13532/spiderman_with_great_power_comes_great_responsibility_2010_-_2011
[https://perma.cc/K83P-LMUE] (last visited Oct 29, 2020).
58
See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMM’N ON CHINA, 115TH CONG.,
ANN. REP. 225–33 (2018),
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/Annual%20Report
%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX65-MS68]; Neil Thomas, Party All the Time:
Xi Jinping’s Governance Reform Agenda After the Fourth Plenum, MACRO POLO
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://macropolo.org/analysis/xi-jinping-ccp-china-governancereforms-the-fourth-plenum/ [https://perma.cc/T9PT-8UAL].
59
See Cheng Li, Think National, Blame Local: Central-Provincial Dynamics in
the Hu Era, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Winter 2006, at 5 (explaining that
under Hu, the central government sought to pin blame for crises on local leaders,
including through promulgation of new regulations); cf. Ran Ran, Understanding
Blame Politics in China’s Decentralized System of Environmental Governance:
Actors, Strategies and Context, 231 CHINA Q. 634, 651 (2017) (“Decentralizing
environmental responsibilities to local governments created a necessary
prerequisite and allows more space for blaming local officials.”); see also Dan
Chen, Local Distrust and Regime Support: Sources and Effects of Political Trust
in China, 70 POL. RSCH. Q. 314, 319 (2017) (“Facing various socioeconomic
problems and challenges that arise during rapid economic growth and
urbanization, the central government has allowed mild media criticism on local
governments and officials and even local protests for the public to vent and let off
steam of anger and frustration.”).
60
Minzner, Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in
China, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 53, 121–122 (2009),
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In the context of the COVID-19 crisis (again echoing
SARS 61 ), phenomena consistent with this pattern were evident.
Outside reports blamed local authorities’ fears of the consequences
of sharing information about the emerging problem with Beijing—
and thus running the risk of being held to blame for the bad news—
for the failure of what was supposed to be the automatic system of
direct reporting to central public health authorities. 62 By early
February, Xi Jinping, in a speech to the Politburo Standing
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1115&context=jil
[https://perma.cc/AHM4-GQHJ]; U.S. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMM’N ON
CHINA, Communist Party, State Council Order Stronger Controls Over Society,
Oct. 4, 2006, https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commissionanalysis/communist-party-state-council-order-stronger-controls-over-society
[https://perma.cc/5MPD-S7B3] (The “core leader” (yibashou) at each level of the
official Chinese party and government hierarchy should personally bear
responsibility for maintaining social order, and that Chinese officials should
develop a “correct view of their official achievements.”).
61
See, e.g., Zhu Xiaochao (朱晓超), Caijing SARS Meizhou Diaocha (财经 SARS
每周调查) [Caijing Weekly Report of SARS], SINA (May 19, 2003, 6:08 PM),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20030519/1808342116.shtml
[https://perma.cc/4GU2-WBGU] (reporting that 120 local officials were fired or
reprimanded during the SARS crisis); Jia Yue & Duan Xinyi (贾玥 & 段欣毅),
Feidian Liuyan Daobi Xinxigongkai Jiakuai Lifa Cuisheng Fayanren Zhidu (非典
流言倒逼信息公开 加快立法催生发言人制度) [Rumors about SARS Forced
Information Disclosure], RENMIN WANG (人民网) [PEOPLE] (Mar. 25, 2013, 8:52
AM), http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0325/c1026-20900650-3.html
[https://perma.cc/ZM9V-46C2] (listing many sanctioned local officials); Sue
Chan, Beijing Mayor Sacked in SARS Scandal, CBS (Apr. 22, 2003, 7:34 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/beijing-mayor-sacked-in-sars-scandal;
[https://perma.cc/77MU-J2JJ]; see also Huang, supra note 6, at 124–25 (stating
that 1,000 government officials were fired for mishandling SARS); Stu Woo,
China Ousts Senior Officials as Beijing Seeks Distance from Outbreak, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 14, 2020, 8:28 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-ousts-topofficial-in-coronavirus-outbreaks-epicenter-11581568911
[https://perma.cc/9ZGH-GSNH] (noting that many, primarily lower-ranking
officials have been fired as a result of the handling of COVID in a way
reminiscent of the response to SARS).
62
See, e.g., Myers, supra note 7 (explaining that after SARS, reporting to the
central authorities was supposed to be “automatic,” but that in Wuhan, local
health authorities kept Beijing “in the dark” out of fear of sharing bad news);
Edward Wong et al., Local Officials in China Hid Coronavirus Danger from
Beijing, U.S. Agencies Find, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/asia/china-coronavirus-beijingtrump.html [https://perma.cc/TU5G-EG8Q].
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Committee, pointed to shortcomings by local party, government, and
public health officials in the initial handling of the outbreak in
Wuhan. 63 Echoing the SARS-era ouster of Beijing Mayor Meng
Xuenong and lesser officials, the aftermath of the delayed initial
response to the novel coronavirus outbreak brought the dismissal of
party chiefs Ma Guoqiang in Wuhan and Jiang Chaoliang in Hubei,
as well as hundreds of lower-level officials in those jurisdictions and
in other COVID-hit areas.64 Notably, the pace of firings picked up
amid rising public outcry over Wuhan authorities having silenced the
since-deceased Dr. Li.65

63

Xi Jinping (习近平), President, P.R.C., Zai Zhongyangzhengzhiju Changweihui
Huiyi Yanjiusuo Yingdui Xinxing Guanzhuangbingdu Feiyan Yiqing Gongzuo
Shi de Jianghua (在中央政治局常委会会议研究应对新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情工
作时的讲话) [Xi’s Speech in the Politburo Standing Committee’s meeting on
Covid-19 responses], (Feb. 16, 2020) (transcript available at
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0216/c64094-31589177.html
[https://perma.cc/LT9X-MDR3]), §§ 1, 2, 4.
64
Central-level officials were spared even though some of the fateful delay
occurred after information about developments in Wuhan had reached higher
levels.
65
Xu Tian (徐天), Guanchang “Yiqing Wenze” Guancha; Mianzhi Shi
Shenmeyang de Wenze Shouduan? (官场“疫情问责”观察 免职是什么样的问责
手段？) [Official “Pandemic Accountability” Observation: What Kind of
Accountability is Dismissal?], CHINA NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020, 8:44 AM),
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2020/03-05/9114184.shtml
[https://perma.cc/2NJW-YCAH7CTC-JXGT] (reporting dismissal of numerous
government officials); Steven Lee Myers, China Ousts 2 Party Officials amid
Outrage About Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/world/asia/china-coronavirus-xijinping.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/world/asia/china-coronavirusxi-jinping.html [https://perma.cc/RZ89-39RN] (reporting ouster of Wuhan and
Hubei Party Secretaries); Qiang Lijing et al., China Penalizes Derelict Officials in
Coronavirus Fight, XINHUA (Feb. 5, 2020, 12:40 AM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/05/c_138755872.htm.
[https://perma.cc/SBY6-FWRV]; Willian Zheng, Coronavirus: Beijing Purges
Communist Party Heads in Hubei Over ‘Botched’ Outbreak Response in
Provincial Capital of Wuhan, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 13,
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050372/coronavirusbeijings-purge-over-virus-takes-down-top-communist [https://perma.cc/WPN5AWEY]; Swaine, supra note 46 (concerning central authorities’ role in preventing
release of information to public after they became aware of emerging epidemic in
Wuhan).
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Many of these moves could find foundation, or at least
resonance, in laws and rules providing for demotions, firings, civil,
and criminal punishment for local governments (as well as public
health institutions), the officials who staff them, or others (including
those not holding government posts) who failed to perform, or
performed badly, their duties in responding to potential or actual
outbreaks of infectious diseases, epidemics or public health
emergencies.66
Tiao and Fragmented/Ambiguous Governance
During SARS, the sacking of officials deemed at fault for a
flawed response (most prominently, Minster of Health Zhang
Wenkang) reflected difficulties that extended to the functionally
differentiated, central-government-unit-led, tiao side of governance.
67
Although such high-level figures did not fall in 2020 (possibly
because the centrally directed response came sooner and was more
effective than in 2003), here, too, the SARS experience loosely
foreshadowed analogous issues during the initial response to
COVID-19. Officials at lower levels in the public health and disease
control and prevention bureaucracy were among those disciplined or
fired after the problematic initial handling of the novel coronavirus
outbreak.68 Some of the tiao-side problems were the obverse of the
kuai-side issues discussed above, but others involved more distinctly
tiao-side attributes.
These features include aspects of what is often called China’s
“fragmented authoritarianism”69—a system of governance in which
66

See Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, arts. 63, 67–68; Infectious
Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 65–68; Regulations on Responses, supra note
31, arts. 45, 47, 49.
67
Mark Oliver, China Sacks Minister over Sars, GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2003, 8:06
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/20/sars.markoliver
[https://perma.cc/E9AG-M7U2] (reporting that China’s health minister was fired
over the mishandling of SARS).
68
Erin Mendell, China Fires Highest-Level Officials Yet Over Coronavirus
Oubreak, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-fireshighest-level-officials-yet-over-coronavirus-outbreak-11581447269
[https://perma.cc/7J97-4PKM] (reporting firing of Party Secretary and Director of
Hubei Provincial Health Commission).
69
See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its
Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO
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the institutional building blocks (both bureaucratic/vertical and
geographic/horizontal) often function as highly discrete actors, with
independent and conflicting interests and agendas, that battle and
bargain in a largely political process to shape regime policies and
priorities. To be sure, coexisting governmental or political
institutions that are “siloed” from one another are near-universal
problems, 70 but the challenges have been distinctive and highly
salient in China. This fragmentation entails several interlinked
features, and all of them were evident in the early reaction to COVID19.
First, members—and especially leaders—of governmental
organs tend to identify with their own institutions (such as ministries
and similar bodies at the central level, or provincial and lower-level
governments and party organs), and view counterparts in other units
as outsiders. This identification with the unit, or danwei, is often
CHINA, supra note 28, at 6–12, 20–25 (setting forth a “fragmented
authoritarianism” model for Chinese policy-making); David M. Lampton, A Plum
for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China, in
BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra
note 28, at 33; Andrew Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political
Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process, 200 CHINA Q. 995, 996–997, 1012
(2009) (assessing applicability of fragmented authoritarianism model in more
recent period and noting opportunities it creates for policy entrepreneurs,
particularly in water resource policy); Yanzhong Huang, The State of China’s
State Apparatus, 28 ASIAN PERSP. 31, 55–59 (2004) (describing “bureaucratic
fragmentation” as a problem for regulatory policy-making and coordination in
China, including in the public health sector); see also Yu Xiaohong & Yang Hui (
于晓虹 & 杨惠), Dangzheng Tizhi Chonggou Shiyu xia Zhengfa
Gongzuo Tuijin Luoji de Zaishenshi ( 党政体制重构视阈下政法工作推进
逻辑的再审视) [Reexamining the Logic of Advancing Political-Legal Work from
the Perspective of Reconstructing the Party-Government System], ZHONGGUO
SHEHUIKEXUE WANG (中国社会科学网) [CHINESE SOC. SCI. NET] (July 21, 2019,
09:26 AM), http://www.cssn.cn/fx/202007/t20200721_5158007_2.shtml
[https://perma.cc/8NFQ-97NY] (describing party-focused efforts to overcome
fragmentation among government institutions in the Xi era).
70
See, e.g., B. Guy Peters, The Challenge of Policy Coordination, 1 POL’Y
DESIGN & PRAC. 1, 4–5 (2018) (pointing to factors including specialization,
information-hoarding, and ignorance of collective goals as explanations for the
“persistence of . . . ‘silos’ and ‘stove pipes’ that exist in most governments”);
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (describing administrative
procedures as means to address the principal-agent problem between political
leaders and bureaucratic institutions).
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robust, notwithstanding the pull of “dual rule” on sub-national-level
officials staffing branches of ministry-headed bureaucracies that also
are parts of local governments. Very often, kuai dominates tiao in
the orientation and behavior of such officials, especially when legal
and policy mandates do not clearly give one priority over the other.
These dynamics appear to have been at work in the initial
response to COVID-19 in Wuhan and Hubei. Many of the roles that
the relevant laws assign in addressing potential epidemics are
allocated in overlapping ways to the tiao-side public health and
disease control and prevention bureaucracies and to the kuai-side
local governments (often in their supervisory capacity over local
health commissions and infectious disease control and prevention
institutions). By assigning key roles in monitoring, reporting,
informing the public, and responding to disease outbreaks to
provincial or local-level health commissions and disease control and
prevention institutions, the laws encourage (or at least do not
discourage) the tendency for such organs to align with their samelevel governments more than their higher-level bureaucratic
superiors.71
These features are consistent with significant aspects of the
early reaction to COVID-19, including: the pattern of failure by key
actors in the public health system who were part of, or accountable
to, Wuhan authorities to follow faithfully the Direct Reporting
System and the requirements that it and other rules imposed to report
immediately to central public health authorities (a pattern that
included moves by those authorities to impose narrow diagnostic
criteria and to require official approval for reporting); 72 and the
obstruction undertaken by many of those same actors and the
resulting frustration experienced by the investigative teams
dispatched to Wuhan by higher-level authorities in the NHC- and
CDC-led public health system. According to accounts from
participants in Wuhan, use of, and compliance with, the direct
reporting system (and prompt reporting more generally) were
effectively impeded by local officials and the hospital leaders who
71

See Peters, supra note 70; McCubbins, supra note 70.
Both the Infectious Disease Law and rules concerning Direct Reporting System
outline specific instances which would trigger mandatory reporting requirements.
See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 30–38; Measures for Information
Reporting, supra note 36.
72
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answered to them. 73 According to a report based on leaked
documents from Wuhan, the average time between onset of
symptoms and confirmed (and, thus, reportable) diagnosis exceeded
three weeks into early March.74 The difficulties encountered by the
investigative teams also reflect a second type of tiao-side problem.
Second, the relative strength and status of government units—
and, thus, the rules they implement—matter a great deal in China’s
fragmented system. The public health/infectious disease institutions
(xitong—system—in the argot of Chinese governance) are
comparatively weak actors in China’s complex bureaucratic politics.
In the official hierarchy of Chinese governance, the CDC is a ting—
a sub-ministry-level entity under the NHC, and the NHC is the
equivalent of a ministry. The NHC’s director has the rank of
buzhang—minister—and thus is formally a peer of the heads of
twenty-five other ministries and commissions of the central
government and broadly on par with a provincial governor (such as
the governor of Hubei).
Formal status is only part of the story in Chinese politics. The
public health bureaucracy has been a troubled system, going through
multiple recent restructurings, from the Ministry of Health (which
was the target of much criticism after SARS), to the National Health
and Family Planning Commission in 2013 (which encompassed
responsibilities for China’s long-fraught and contentious population
control programs), to the current National Health Commission in
2018 (less than two years before the outbreak of COVID-19).
Throughout, the national public health bureaucracy has not been
headed by officials with the political prominence (or superministerial ranks, such as State Councilor) possessed by the heads of
some major ministries or commissions that deal with perennially
high-priority matters such as economics or national security.
Senior public health experts and officials had long
complained that public health policy was generally not a high priority
for policy makers, that its importance was not understood by leaders
or by the public, and that the CDC’s powers were extremely limited.
They drew unfavorable contrasts with the United States’ CDC, which
they characterized as well-funded and highly respected (before the
reputational damage wrought by the Trump administration’s handling
73
74

See supra discussion and sources accompanying note 43.
See Walsh, supra note 5.
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of COVID-19) and reporting directly to the White House. Some also
were distressed by moves at local levels in China that reportedly
merged CDC branches into other government units, thereby
undermining upward reporting and accountability to the nationallevel CDC and further strengthening the tendency for kuai to
overshadow tiao.75
Concerns about weaknesses in the state’s public health and
disease control system—its lack of capacity and clout, which had
been blamed for shortcomings in handling SARS—had spurred
reforms to strengthen and centralize the bureaucratic apparatus. 76
75

Jeremy Page & Lingling Wei, China’s CDC, Built to Stop Pandemics Like
COVID, Stumbled When It Mattered Most, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2020, 10:30
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-cdc-built-to-stop-pandemics-stumbledwhen-it-mattered-most-11597675108 [https://perma.cc/7VVK-HA9X]; Ye
Shuisong (叶水送), Guojia Jikongzhongxin Qianzhuren Li Liming: Yihou Guonei
Gonggongweisheng Tixi Ruhe Gaige? (国家疾控中心前主任李立明：疫后国内
公共卫生体系如何改革？) [Former Director of CDC Li Liming: How to Reform
National Public Health System after the Pandemic?] (Chen Xiaoxue (陈晓雪)
ed.), ZHISHIFENZI (知识分子) (May 19, 2020),
http://www.zhishifenzi.com/depth/depth/9051.html [https://perma.cc/R9GK7Q79]; Zhang Ranran (张冉燃), Gongongweisheng Shouxian Yao Xing Gong (公
共卫生首先要姓公), XINHUA (May 11, 2020, 9:40 AM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2020-05/11/c_1125967825.htm
[https://perma.cc/YG7P-GKA3]; see also Cheng Jinquan (程锦泉), Woguo Jibing
Yufangkongzhi Tixi Xiandaihua Jianshe de Sikao ji Duice Jianyi (我国疾病预防
控制体系现代化建设的思考及对策建议) [Thought and Suggestions on Modern
Construction of Disease Prevention and Control System], 54 CHINESE J.
PREVENTIVE MED. (中华预防医学杂志) 475, 476, (May 6, 2020),
http://rs.yiigle.com/CN112150202005/1194071.htm (concerning the “extremely
limited” powers of CDC).
Admiring comparisons were to the U.S. CDC predated the Trump
administration’s moves to marginalize its influence and undermine its
independence, insulation from politics, and adherence to norms of science-based
assessments and recommendations. See Martha Kinsella et al., Trump
Administration Abuses Thwart Pandemic Response, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/trumpadministration-abuses-thwart-us-pandemic-response [https://perma.cc/Y7S73RWJ]; Lena H. Sun & Joel Achenbach, CDC’s Credibility is Eroded by Internal
Blunders and External Attacks as Coronavirus Vaccine Campaign Looms, WASH.
POST (Sep. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/09/28/cdcunder-attack/ [https://perma.cc/5R8S-4D88].
76
See supra discussion accompanying note 7, of the principal laws and
regulations, all of which were adopted or revised significantly after SARS; David
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But such reforms did not greatly transform the landscape of power
and resources. For example, CDC leadership still pressed criticisms
that after the post-SARS-reforms, the CDC was still short on
resources, low in morale, and lacking the authority to issue directly
early warnings about disease outbreaks to local hospitals and the
public, to make policy, or to enforce pandemic-related laws
(including by imposing administrative sanctions).77
The problem of a relatively weak national public health
bureaucracy is hardly unique to China. But it is more pronounced in
a system that puts a high emphasis on economic performance. This
priority could be set aside—and in the context of COVID-19 to some
Hipgrave, Communicable Disease Control in China: From Mao to Now, J. GLOB.
HEALTH (Dec. 2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3484775/
[https://perma.cc/EAK9-D8M4] (praising centralization within and greater
attention to CDC and improvements to laws governing infectious diseases after
SARS); Chengyue Li et al., The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
System in China: Trends from 2002–2012, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2093, 2101
(2016) (“China’s CDC System has shown remarkable improvements in resource
allocation and service delivery.”).
77
See Lilia Wu & Evelyn Cheng, Virus Disclosure in China Was Delayed
Because Disease Control Group Lacks Authority, Top Scientist Says, CNBC (Feb.
28, 2020, 7:38 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/chinas-cdc-lacksauthority-to-alert-public-on-virus-scientist-says.html [https://perma.cc/E69YAU7Z] (reporting on “budget cuts and talent losses” at the CDC); Li Liming (李
立明) et al., Yiqing Zaoqi, Jibing Yufang Kongzhi Tixi Shisheng Yuanyin Hezai?
(疫情早期，疾病预防控制体系失声原因何在？) [At the Early Stage of
Pandemic, Why Was the Disease Prevention and Control System Slient?],
ZHISHIFENZI (知识分子) (Mar. 3, 2020),
http://zhishifenzi.com/depth/depth/8392.html [https://perma.cc/QTW7-FKMZ]
(describing CDC as a technical institution without supervisory or law
enforcement powers or adequate resources, according to CDC Director); Cheng,
supra note 75 (describing CDC’s lack of authority to disclose information to the
public, make policy, and exercise powers of enforcement/administrative
punishment); Sidney Leng, China’s Coronavirus Response Slowed by
Bureaucracy, Unstable Funding as Government Never Empowered Lower Level
Officials, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 9, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3073960/chinascoronavirus-response-slowed-bureaucracy-unstable [https://perma.cc/RJ5EWPBE] (noting CDC lacked authority to issue an early warning to hospitals). See
also Fan Jiang et al., Towards Evidence-Based Public Health Policy in China,
381 LANCET 1962, 1963 (2013) (“By contrast with evidence-based medicine,
which is mainly practised at the grassroots level, mindset change from opinionbased to evidence-based decision making can start from the top. Administrative
officials could exert their influence downward to accelerate the transition.”).
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extent it was, at least briefly—under exceptional circumstances, such
as an economy-shaking severe public health crisis. But such focusshifting circumstances tend to arise or become evident—as they did
in the COVID-19 pandemic—only after it is too late to address
shortcomings in time to avoid a crisis and its adverse economic
consequences.
The early days of COVID-19 reflected the continued relative
lack of stature and power of China’s public health and diseaseresponse institutions. Leaked documents lament the Hubei provincial
center for disease control and prevention’s lack of funding, capacity
and staff morale on the eve of COVID-19, and criticize local branches
for not having played a leading, rather than merely passive, role in
the early phases of the epidemic.78 Despite features in the legal and
regulatory framework that envisaged greater reliance on central
public health and infectious disease institutions and their expertise,
the 2004 revisions to the Infectious Disease Law and other laws did
not raise the then-new Direct Reporting System to the status of law,
nor—at least in the eyes of critics—did they establish sufficiently
clear legal thresholds or duties for direct reporting. Because the
infectious disease and outbreak reporting system was geared to
already-identified diseases and COVID-19 was a new disease, the
law left local actors greater latitude in not immediately reporting the
novel virus (until central authorities issued a specific directive on
reporting requirements and application of the highest-level, Class A
protocols for the novel coronavirus in late January). 79 By not
adequately directing medical staff to bypass superiors, the monitoring,
reporting, and investigation framework was left at greater risk of
being undermined by the type of obstructionism by local authorities
and hospital leadership that occurred in Wuhan. 80 Resort to the
78

Walsh, supra note 5 (quoting Hubei CDC report and other leaked documents).
See Wang Xixin (王锡锌), Chuanranbing Yiqing Xinxi Gongkai de Zhang’ai ji
Kefu (传染病疫情信息公开的障碍及克服) [The Obstacles for Information
Disclosure in Infectious Disease Pandemics and the Ways to Overcome the
Obstacles], FAXUE (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/raqY4vNJmKz2UCHTEQgpZg
[https://perma.cc/8KRZ-NGYG].
80
Relevant laws and regulations direct medical personnel to make reports through
their hospitals or through local-level disease control and prevention institutions—
which are the local branch of the CDC and, as discussed above, are part of
notably weak central institutions and have been greatly subordinated to, or even
79
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Direct Reporting System was also undermined by medical
personnel’s poor understanding of the reporting procedure, the costs
to them (in terms of resources and distraction from the urgent task of
treating patients) of filling out reports, and doubts about whether
cases fit the uncertain and shifting criteria for reporting, in an
environment where the importance of the Direct Reporting System
had not been emphasized.81 These features collectively gave local
officials in Wuhan responsible for public health more room, and
reasons, to shirk tiao-side obligations and to opt for the side of the
“double or nothing bet” that entailed eschewing the Direct Reporting
System and not cooperating with the expert teams sent out under the
auspices of the NHC.82
Some of the most striking—yet archetypical—testimony
about relative institutional weakness comes from those frustrated
agents of public health units whom higher-level authorities
dispatched during the early weeks of the outbreak to the viral
epicenter in Wuhan, where they encountered such potent resistance
from those associated with the units of local governance. As Dr.
Zhong—the leader of the third and crucial investigative delegation—
put it, what happened in Wuhan exposed the “shortcomings” of a
system in which the “CDC’s position” was “too low” as a mere
“technical department” that could “only report upward” and “level by
absorbed into other, local-level government organs. Infectious Disease Law,
supra note 32, art. 30–38; Measures for Information Reporting, supra note 36,
art. 16–20; National Implementation Plan, supra note 38, §§ 3–4, 6; Wuhan
Yiqing, supra note 40. See also Edward Gu & Lantian Li, Crippled Community
Governance and Suppressed Scientific/Professional Communities: A Critical
Assessment of Failed Early Warning for the COVID-19 Outbreak in China, 5
J.CHINESE GOVERNANCE 160 (2020),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23812346.2020.1740468
[https://perma.cc/9C6B-6YGT] (arguing that the lack of autonomy among
scientific and professional communities, including doctors, and the dominance of
the epidemic governance system by local “bureaucratic forces,” contributed to the
“failed early warning” of the COVID-19 outbreak).
81
See Shen Kui (沈岿), Lun Tufa Chuanranbing Xinxi Fabu de Falü Shezhi (论突
发传染病信息发布的法律设置) [On the Legal Settings of the Information
Release of Emergent Infectious Diseases], DANGDAI FAXUE (当代法学)
[CONTEMP. L. REV.], no.4, 2020, at 27, 31–32, (describing the lack of competent
public health experts at local level and medical personnel’s lack of understanding
of the Reporting System).
82
For a detailed account of the non-activation or avoidance of the Direct
Reporting System, see Yang, supra note 13.
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level”—an arrangement that was contemplated by relevant
regulations (including those governing public health emergencies),
and that meant slower response times (especially compared to what
the Direct Reporting System was designed to achieve), and more
influence for geography-based government units (kuai) relative to the
CDC-NHC (tiao) structure. 83 Zhong elaborated, “Except for
reporting to upper levels of authorities, the CDC has no power to
make any decision for the next move.”84 In the words of an expert in
the second NHC delegation, they “were not allowed to step in”
because “territorial management” was mandated (by the Infectious
Disease Law, among other things), and the expert group’s role was
“only” to “offer some help.”85 As noted earlier, the relative weakness
of the CDC and NHC structures also made the delegations
problematically dependent on Wuhan local authorities (and those
who answered primarily to them), and thus vulnerable to being
hamstrung by recalcitrant responses and non-disclosure.
This is not to say that the tiao side was entirely marginalized
during the early weeks of responding to the novel coronavirus.
According to an official timeline and other sources, some information
about the outbreak had reached the NHC (including through the endof-December leaks of the WHC documents) and prompted some
measures in early and mid-January, including a reported NHC
directive to health organizations not to make public reports and to
impose narrow diagnostic criteria, the establishment of a COVIDfocused leading group within the NHC, the creation of guidelines on
early detection, diagnosis, quarantine, prevention, and control, and
the dispatch of the three successive expert delegations to Wuhan and
more than a half-dozen investigative teams to other locations. 86
While these actions might strengthen arguments for assigning
to national public health institutions some of the responsibility for

83

Wuhan Yiqing, supra note 40; Yang, supra note 1310; Regulations on
Responses, supra note 31, art. 20.
84
Wu & Cheng, supra note 77.
85
Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 30.
86
STATE COUNCIL INFO. OF. P.R.C., supra note 14, § I. On the order not to report
publicly, see Gao Yu et al., supra note 47; Myers, supra note 7; on diagnostic
criteria, see Walsh, supra note 5.
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shortcomings in the initial response,87 their relatively limited—and in
some cases critically delayed—moves also reflect those institutions’
limited roles and powers, especially when measured against the
ambitious aims that motivated the adoption of the Direct Reporting
System and other post-SARS reforms to the legal and regulatory
framework for handling infectious diseases and public health
emergencies. Notably, the shift to a more effective response to the
COVID-19 crisis followed intervention by central authorities above
the level of the NHC and CDC, including Xi Jinping, Premier Li
Keqiang, the State Council and an ad hoc top-level party group
established to focus on the pandemic (and with NHC head Ma’s
initial national teleconference purporting to relay instructions from
Xi, Li, and Vice Premier Sun Chunlan.88
Third, the institutional fragmentation of Chinese governance
also means that officials often operate in an environment of ambiguity
born of legal and policy mandates, from multiple sources, that
sometimes do not clearly delineate functions and responsibilities.
This can mean significant difficulties for effective governance, all the
more so given other characteristics of the Chinese system addressed
elsewhere in this article. In principle, China’s legal system does
provide for a hierarchy of sources of law, ranging from the
constitution to laws adopted by the National People’s Congress or its
Standing Committee, to administrative regulations promulgated by
the State Council, to rules issued by subnational-level legislative
bodies and central government ministries and commissions, to
normative documents that do not have the full formal force of law,
and so on. In principle, lower level rules must be consistent with
higher-level rules to be valid. In practice, the situation is a good deal
messier. 89 Lower-level rules are sometimes amended without

87

See Swaine, supra note 46 (assigning partial responsibility—and more than
what is assigned in many analyses of the initial phase of COVID-19—for early
shortcomings to central authorities).
88
These issues are addressed more fully infra note 139; see also NAT’L HEALTH
COMM’N P.R.C., supra note 19.
89
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法法)
[Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, rev’d Mar. 15, 2015, effective Mar. 15, 2015),
arts. 78–86, CLI.1.245693(EN) (Lawinfochina); Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal
System with Chinese Characteristics, 24 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 47–49
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corresponding changes to higher-level sources of law. Officials often
regard the most specific, sometimes formally lower-ranking source
as the most relevant or dispositive. Meta-rules to resolve, or even
discern, conflicts among primary rules are not very systematic,
coherent, or robust in governmental (or even much legal) thinking.90
Processes to provide definitive interpretations of, or resolution of
conflicts among, rules are relatively weak or informal. Powers of
judicial review do not extend formally to the authority to strike down
laws or regulations for non-conformity with higher laws, and
legislative exercises of powers of oversight and review of lower-tier
sources of law are rare and weak in practice. 91 Diverse or
inconsistent rules from entities of equal rank within China’s
fragmented and siloed state often can be resolved effectively only
through intervention (often of a legally informal type) by higher
levels (often at the level of the “common superior” of the contending
institutions).92

(2010); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF
LAW 239–242 (2002).
90
See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE
(Anders Wedberg trans., 1945) (concerning the importance of higher-level norms
for determining the validity of more specific, lower-level norms).
91
See Shen Kui, Administrative “Self-Regulation” and the Rule of Administrative
Law in China, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 73 (2018); He Haibo, How Much Progress
Can Legislation Bring? The 2014 Amendment of the Administrative Litigation
Law of PRC, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 137 (2018).
92
See Donald C. Clarke, Peter Murrell and Susan Whiting, The Role of Law in
China’s Economic Development in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
(Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008) 376–379, 414 (concerning the
need to resort to a “common superior” to resolve, often informally, disputes
among agents, primarily in economic contexts); Shirk, The Chinese Political
System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform, in BUREAUCRACY,
POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra note 28, at 59, 62,
72–75, 86–87 (concerning the dispersion of authority to make policies and rules
among discrete units); John K. Yasuda, China’s Rigid Governance System Means
Local Health Problems Can Easily Go National, WASH. POST, (Feb. 3, 2020, 6:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/03/chinas-rigidgovernance-system-means-local-health-problems-can-easily-go-national/
[https://perma.cc/T7MZ-F8HF] (describing challenges of coordination on a vast
scale across multiple government institutions with different governance processes
as impediment to responding to COVID-19 and other health crises).
As is addressed later in this article, these attributes within the realm of
formal laws and regulations are compounded by their coexistence with directives,

104

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

One aspect of the phenomenon of multiple, and collectively
ambiguous, rules may be reflected in a notorious incident from the
initial response to COVID-19. Facing criticism for not informing the
public during the early weeks of the growing epidemic, Wuhan
Mayor Zhou Xianwang—who also headed the city’s Novel
Coronavirus Infection Control and Prevention Headquarters—
explained that he had delayed releasing information because “as a
local government, I can only disclose information . . . after I have
received authorization.”93 If sincere, the mayor’s position adopts a
plausible but problematic construction of relevant law. Provisions in
the Infectious Disease Law give the NHC responsibility for issuing
warnings and releasing information to the public about outbreaks or
epidemics (and potential outbreaks and epidemics). The same law
and relevant regulations contemplate provincial-level HCs receiving
specific NHC authorization to release information about such
developments to the public. 94 The NHC’s authorization for
in some cases issued by organs of the Communist Party—sometimes jointly with
state bodies—and, still-more-informal sources and uses of political power.
93
Zhang Yuting (张雨亭), Wuhan Shizhang Cheng Wuquan Gongbu Yiqing? (武
汉市长称无权公布疫情？) [Municipal of Wuhan Claiming No Right to Make
Public the Pandemic], NANFANG DUSHI BAO (南方都市报) [S. METROPOLIS
DAILY]: SOHU (搜狐) (Jan. 30, 2020, 9:36 PM),
https://www.sohu.com/a/369630319_161795 [https://perma.cc/43FF-DFHU] (“As
a local government, I can only disclose information . . . after I have received
authorization.”); Langlang (郎朗) et al., Wuhan Shizhang Chengren Qianqi Xinxi
Pilu Bujishi (武汉市长承认前期信息披露不及时) [Municipal of Wuhan
Admitted Untimely Disclosure of Information at the Early Stage], SINA (Jan. 27,
2020, 3:49 PM), https://news.sina.cn/gn/2020-01-27/detailiihnzhha4917463.d.html [https://perma.cc/46JG-26G6]; Wuhan Chengli Xinxing
Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihui Bu (武汉成立新型
冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控指挥部) [Wuhan Establishes Novel Coronavirus
Infection Pneumonia Prevention and Control Command Center], XINHUA (Jan.
21, 2020) http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-01/21/c_1125487978.htm
[https://perma.cc/TE2A-3M8X]; see also Zhao Hong (赵宏), “Weijing Shouquan
Bude Pilu” Beihou de Xinxi Gongkai Zhidu yu Wenti (“未经授权不得披露”背后
的信息公开制度与问题) [Information Disclosure System and Problem Behind
“No Unauthorized Information Disclosure”], PENGPAI (澎湃) [THE PAPER] (Jan.
31, 2020, 2:27 PM), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_5700131
[https://perma.cc/ZZ5J-JQJJ] (discussing whether the Wuhan Mayor’s position on
disclosure has legal justification).
94
Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 19, 38; Regulations on Responses,
supra note 31, art. 25; Measures for Information Reporting, supra note 36, art. 32.
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provincial-level HCs to release information has been granted, on a
general, not case-by-case, basis.95 None of that would have legally
required, or authorized, Zhou—as a sub-provincial-level leader—to
make a public announcement about the emerging epidemic. Yet, the
Emergency Response Law authorizes local people’s governments
(such as the one in Wuhan headed by Zhou) to issue an early public
warning and provide the public with information and guidance about
an imminent public health emergency, so long as such actions are
consistent with relevant statutes and regulations. 96
If the mayor’s statement is disingenuous, it shows the
potential for an official to exploit regulatory ambiguity and adopt
self-serving readings of law in an effort to shirk responsibility or shift
blame. This can be a tempting, and sometimes effective, defensive
move for an official who has erred in wagering that he or she could
contain an escalating problem—such as the COVID-19 outbreak—
without attracting game-changing attention from higher levels.
Another example of the consequences of collectively
ambiguous rules in China’s fragmented governance may be in the
delayed reporting of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan. The Direct
Reporting System called for rapid direct reporting to central CDC
authorities of potentially dangerous infectious disease outbreaks of
uncertain origin, and relevant rules called for use of the Direct
Reporting System. But those rules also left room for the use of
“report cards” to be submitted through alternate channels, particularly
for entities that had not yet adopted or were not authorized to use the
Direct Reporting System. Although the rules called for speedy
transmission through such channels, they relied in part on a structure
that was more dependent on level-by-level, geographic-unit based
reporting.97 That more kuai-leaning structure remained embedded in
95

Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 42–45, 53; Infectious Disease
Law, supra note 32, art. 19, 38; Weishengbu Fading Chuanranbing Yiqing he
Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shijian Xinxi Fabu de Fangan (卫生部法定传染病疫
情和突发公共卫生事件信息发布的方案) [Ministry of Health Plan for Public
Release of Information Concerning Statutory Infectious Diseases and Public
Health Emergencies) (promulgated by Ministry of Health, Mar. 3, 2006, effective
Mar. 3, 2006), § 1, CLI.4.76664 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Plan for Public
Release of Information].
96
Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 42–45.
97
Measures for Information Reporting, supra note 36, art. 18–19; National
Implementation Plan, supra note 38, § 3 (2004); Weishengbu Guanyu Yinfa
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more general, formally higher-level laws and regulations that also
governed reporting on such outbreaks.98
In the circumstances of COVID-19’s emergence, both sets of
rules arguably applied (as did other legal requirements concerning
reporting). Critical reports indicate that, in a move of questionable
legal propriety, local authorities in Wuhan opted, during the crucial
early weeks of January, not to have medical staff follow the Direct
Reporting System and—at best—to apply the less demanding
alternatives for providing timely information to central authorities.
Those alternatives allowed for “consultations” at local levels that
could delay reporting, and had an imprecise and therefore malleable
definition of cases of pneumonia that required urgent and direct
reporting.99 Reported directives from the NHC and provincial and
lower-level public health authorities to apply narrow standards for
defining reportable cases further muddied the waters by adding
specific, if formally lower-tier, measures undermining direct
reporting mandates.100
The effects of indeterminate sets of legal rules and fragmented
government institutions are compounded by the role played by the
Chinese Communist Party and its rules. The party famously—and,
in the Chinese system, legitimately—penetrates and guides state

“Quanguo Bumingyuanyinfeiyan Bingli Jiance, Paicha he Guanli Fangan” de
Tongzhi (卫生部关于印发《全国不明原因肺炎病例监测、排查和管理方案》
的通知) [Ministry of Health Notification on Publishing the “National
Implementation Plan for Surveillance, Investigation, and Management of
Pneumonia Cases of Unknown Etiology”] (promulgated by Ministry of Health,
May 10, 2007, effective May 10, 2007).
98
See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 30–38; Regulations on
Responses, supra note 31, art. 20.
99
Wei, supra note 40 (describing various issues with the reporting system); Yang,
supra note 13, (describing non-use of Direct Reporting System and issues with
local authorities’ actions under the Implementation Plan and its related
Investigation and Management Plan); Hu Shanlian (胡善联), Yi Kuaisu Zhucheng
de Chuanranbing Zhibao Xitong, Zheci Biaoxian Ruhe? (以快速著称的传染病
直报系统，这次表现如何？) [Known for Its Rapidity, How did the Direct
Reporting System Perform This Time?], GUANCHAZHE (观察者) (Mar. 5, 2020,
7:52 AM), https://www.guancha.cn/hushanlian/2020_03_05_539943.shtml
[https://perma.cc/CH6D-JH7C] (assessing performance of the reporting system,
finding slowness in initial response to COVID-19).
100
See supra discussion accompanying note 38.
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institutions.101 The many government officials and staff who are also
party members are formally subject to party, as well as state, rules
and disciplinary procedures. One example of such rules relevant to
the response to COVID-19 is the Xi-era “Regulations of the
Communist Party of China on Requests for Instructions and Reports
on Major Issues,” which require reporting to higher levels in the party
on implementation of policies and seeking instructions from higher
levels on a broad and open-ended range of “major matters,” including
major diseases (and then following higher-level instructions). 102
Another example is the COVID-specific Party Central Committee
“Notice on Strengthening the Party’s Leadership and Providing a
Strong Political Guarantee for Winning the War of Prevention and
Control of the Epidemic,” which foregoes regulation-like directives
but generally exhorts party committees and members to take
leadership roles in COVID response work by government agencies
and public health departments, as well as in mobilizing non-state
actors.103
The non-law character of party rules and directives does not
make them clearly or consistently less significant than state laws and
policies in influencing matters of governance, such as responding to
101

See, e.g., CHENG LI, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY-STATE: THE STRUCTURE
AND DYNAMICS OF POWER, in POLITICS IN CHINA 192, 193–94 (William A.
Joseph ed., 2d ed. 2014) (“In a very real sense, the institutions of party and state
are intimately intertwined [in China] . . . . ”); Tony Saich, GOVERNANCE AND
POLITICS OF CHINA, 109–115 (4th ed. 2015) (describing the role of CCP in
China’s political system).
102
Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Requests for Instructions and
Reports on Major Issues, XINHUA (Apr. 19, 2019),
http://lnupd.com/english/article/shows/269 [https://perma.cc/UXA4-LLP8];
Zhonggongzhongyang Yinfa “Guanyu Jianqiang Dang de Lingdao, Wei Daying
Yiqing Fangkong Zujizhan Tigong Jianqiang Zhengzhi Baozheng de Tongzhi” (中
共中央印发“关于加强党的领导、为打赢疫情防控阻击战提供坚强政治保证
的通知”) [Communist Party of China Central Committee “Notice on
Strengthening the Party’s Leadership and Providing a Strong Political Guarantee
for Winning the War of Prevention and Control of the Epidemic”], ZONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人
民政府) [THE STATE COUNS. PRC] (Jan. 28, 2020, 6: 57 PM),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-01/28/content_5472753.htm
[https://perma.cc/S8KY-V6Q9] [hereinafter Notice]; see also; Xi, supra note 63
(describing the Central Committee Notice).
103
Notice, supra note 102.
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COVID-19. In the Chinese political hierarchy, party secretaries have
power and, often, responsibilities greater than those of mayors at the
city level and governors at the provincial level. Although earlier
periods during the Reform Era emphasized separating party and
government functions, during Xi’s tenure, the role of the party and its
leadership over government have re-expanded (a point reflected, and
stressed, in the Central Committee’s COVID-19 Notice). 104
Tellingly, in the wake of the troubled initial response to the novel
coronavirus outbreak, the most prominent dismissals mainly targeted
the incumbents of party, rather than government, posts. 105
Fourth and finally, fragmentation of authority means that
coordination among siloed institutions is necessary for effective
government action, but such coordination can be difficult to achieve,
especially in contexts like the COVID-19 outbreak. Despite postSARS reforms, responsibility for public health issues remained
spread across numerous central and local government organs. 106 In
Wuhan during the initial COVID-19 outbreak, a monitoring system
104

Christopher K. Johnson & Scott Kennedy, China's Un-Separation of Powers,
FOREIGN AFF. (July 24, 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-24/chinas-un-separationpowers [https://perma.cc/4ZRF-X4AV]; Jamie P. Horsley, Party Leadership and
Rule of Law in the Xi Jinping Era, BROOKINGS (Sept. 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/party-leadership-and-rule-of-law-in-the-xijinping-era/ [https://perma.cc/FA58-4NSA].
105
See Xu, supra note 65 (reporting dismissal of numerous party secretaries in
different institutions); Woo, supra note 61 (reporting the firing of “two top
Communist Party officials in Hubei province” as a result of their mishandling of
the early response to COVID-19); Chao Deng, China Fires Official After New
Coronavirus Cases Emerge in Wuhan Community, WALL. ST. J. (May 11, 2020,
10:49 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-fires-official-after-newcoronavirus-cases-emerge-in-wuhan-community-11589205412
[https://perma.cc/6FVH-GGQH] (reporting on the firing of a party secretary in
charge of a Wuhan residential complex in which new COVID cases emerged).
106
See generally Alex Jingwei He, Manoeuvring within a Fragmented
Bureaucracy: Policy Entrepreneurship in China's Local Healthcare Reform, 236
THE CHINA Q. 1088, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/chinaquarterly/article/manoeuvring-within-a-fragmented-bureaucracy-policyentrepreneurship-in-chinas-local-healthcarereform/514362ABACFED5EFBCC3DF0A4D8EF78E [https://perma.cc/GVV48ATH]; Alex Jingwei He, Is the Chinese Health Bureaucracy Incapable of
Leading Healthcare Reforms?: The Case of Fujian Province, 10 CHINA: INT’L J.,
no. 1, https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-330679069/is-the-chinesehealth-bureaucracy-incapable-of-leading [https://perma.cc/7FZ2-DWET].
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that was premised on active engagement and cooperation among
hospital administrators, the local public health authorities, other units
of local governance, and central public health authorities failed—
“monumentally,” in the words of one expert observer. 107 A full
response (beyond detection and reporting) to an epidemic would
require coordination with still more state entities.
Here, the problem is compounded by China’s version of a
widespread and common problem of governance: the relatively low
importance generally accorded to public health policy and
preparedness. Unless or until a disease outbreak or other issue has
become a major crisis (or appears to be on track to do so), the
concerns that are within the ambit of the public health and disease
control institutions are overshadowed by other matters, such as the
economy or social order. Those issues are within the immediate and
primary responsibilities of other xitong headed by more powerful
central government entities, and are in ordinary times higher
priorities for omnicompetent local leaders such as governors, mayors,
or party secretaries.108 Concerns about triggering public panic—and
thus putting at risk high-priority goals of maintaining social order and
107

Dali L. Yang, China’s Early Warning System Didn’t Work on Covid-19.
Here’s the Story., WASH. POST, (Feb. 24, 2020, 5:13 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/24/chinas-early-warningsystem-didnt-work-covid-19-heres-story [https://perma.cc/77TF-4WKT] (“The
infectious diseases sentinel system only works if the hospitals and local health
administrations actively engage with it and contribute to the information. In
Wuhan, the system failed, monumentally.”); see also Myers, supra note 7
(describing the failure of the Chinese government’s “alarm system” to contain the
outbreak of the Coronavirus).
108
See, e.g., Yijia Jing et al., The Politics of Performance Measurement in China,
34 POL’Y & SOC’Y 49, 49–61 (2017) (listing economic performance and social
order and related goals as still-important criteria among and increasingly complex
set of criteria); Yongshun Cai & Lin Zhu, Disciplining Local Officials in China:
The Case of Conflict Management, 70 CHINA J. 98, 109–103 (2013) (finding that
discipline system for officials create incentives to focus on issues affecting social
stability and/or regime legitimacy); Pierre F. Landry et al., Does Performance
Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder,
51 COMP. POL. STUD. 1074, 1078–1081 (2018) (finding competence in achieving
economic performance, along with political connections to be keys to
advancement for cadres in China); Susan Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System
at the Grass Roots, in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER 104–112 (Cambridge, 2004)
(describing central role of local economic performance in system for evaluating
and promoting local leaders).
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promoting economic activity—reportedly motivated Wuhan officials’
initial delay in fulfilling their public health-related duties of reporting
on the emerging disease outbreak or taking steps that would have
signaled to the public the existence of a serious threat posed by the
novel coronavirus.109
Signals from the top leadership to lower-level officials about
the persisting primacy of concerns with the economy and stability
quickly reemerged once the worst phase of the COVID-19 crisis had
passed. In March and April 2020, a series of speeches by Xi Jinping
and directives from the party’s COVID-focused leading small group
and others began to emphasize reopening the economy, while in some
cases also noting the need for continued attention to social order
(something that might be helped by lifting the strict, often discontentpromoting restrictions imposed to check the spread of the disease). 110
In April, the Supreme People’s Court declared that a priority in
handling civil lawsuits and other judicial work would be to minimize
the pandemic’s economic consequences. The court’s directive called
for, for example, a narrow reading of transaction-disrupting force
majeure claims in contracts, and a flexible approach to requests for
property preservation in litigation (which would protect the interests
of pandemic-imperiled defendant small businesses.)111 To be sure,
109

Jun Mai, Politics May Have Stalled Information in Wuhan Coronavirus Crisis,
Scientist Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 30, 2020, 8:45 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3048283/politics-may-havestalled-information-wuhan-coronavirus-crisis [https://perma.cc/4HVH-2E2D];
Tom Hancock, Coronavirus Makes for Dismal Lunar New Year for Wuhan
Residents, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/975d8fbc-3fed11ea-bdb5-169ba7be433d [https://perma.cc/YXM8-QNWY] (reporting “tense
atmosphere” and censored calls for ousting local leaders after epidemic belatedly
disclosed); Xi, supra note 63 (repeatedly emphasizing importance of maintaining
social stability in responding to COVID-19 and as a key element of successful
epidemic response).
The tension is hardly limited to COVID-19. See Dali L. Yang, China’s
Troubled Quest for Order: Leadership, Organization and the Contradictions of
the Stability Maintenance Regime, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 35 (2017); Anthony
Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1999) (politics “marked by
the push-and-pull between accusations of scaremongering on the one hand and
cover-ups on the other”).
110
See generally STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. P.R.C., supra note 14, at § II.4.
111
Sun Hang (孙航), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi Fuze Ren jiu Chutai Yifa
Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de
Zhidao Yijian (Yi): Da Jizhe Wen (最高人民法院研究室负责人就出台依法妥
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pushes to return to economic normalcy and worries about the
unpopularity of lockdowns and other restrictions quickly emerged in
many COVID-stricken countries, but the pivot taken in China’s
response to COVID-19 was particularly striking and telling, given
China’s especially high and long-running pre-COVID emphasis on
economic growth and stability issues, the severity of the COVIDrelated restrictions that had been imposed in much of China, and the
relative insulation of the Chinese regime from public political
pressure.
Centralization of power has long been a principal method for
addressing the challenges born of fragmentation in China’s
governance, and centralization has been a major trend in politics and
governance during the Xi era. Somewhat paradoxically, however,
centralization of power can exacerbate the problem of lower-level
officials shirking responsibilities—a major problem for the effective
performance of tasks such as responding to a fast-moving disease
outbreak. In a more centralized system, lower-level officials have
incentives to: be passive and adopt wait-and-see attitudes (because
they expect directives to come from above and are reluctant to act in
the absence of such directives); favor nonfeasance over possible
malfeasance (because malfeasance may be, other things being equal,
more likely to be detected and sanctioned by watchful superiors); and
eschew aggressive or proactive measures to address major issues
(unless and until the top-level leaders issue the decisions or send the
signals that come from on high in a centralized system).112
善审理 涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（一）:答记者问)
[Supreme People’s Court Research Office Issues Guidance on the New
Coronavirus Epidemic—Answering Reporters’ Questions], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT.
(Apr. 20, 2020, 10:41 AM), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing226251.html [https://perma.cc/L64J-V6DX].
112
On the problem of “shirking,” see, e.g., Ni Xing & Wang Rui (倪星 & 王锐),
Quanze Fenli yu Jiceng Bize: Yizhong Lilun Jieshi (权责分立与基层避责：一种
理论解释) [Separation of Power and Responsibilities: A Theoretical
Explanation], ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE (中国社会科学) [CHINA SOC. SCI.], no.
5, 2018, at 116,
http://sociology.cssn.cn/xscg/zxwz/201809/W020180917437129089398.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4WX-MDRM] (arguing that the separation of power and
responsibility and the loss of power by local governments leads to shirking); Yan
Jirong (燕继荣), Guanyuan “Lanzheng” Buzuowei Xianxiang Shenceng Yuanyin
Fenxi (官员“懒政”不作为现象深层原因分析), ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG
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Xi’s first public statement concerning the virus on January 20
was such a signal. It was followed by assertions that Xi had been
fully in charge of directing the epidemic response form an early date,
including through instructions issued at a Politburo Standing
Committee meeting on January 7. 113 Although surely meant to
indicate attention and direction from the top in a self-consciously
centralized system, the claim had a problematic political side-effect.
It prompted skepticism about its veracity, and—if the claim were
accepted as true—questions about why an informed and capable top
leadership had not moved more swiftly to mobilize a full-fledged
response to the emerging epidemic.114

XINWEN WANG (中国共产党新闻网) [CPC NEWS] (May 26, 2015, 2:45 PM),
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0526/c112851-27059033.html
[https://perma.cc/3UBP-DWP3] (analyzing the reasons for shirking by local
government officials in China’s government system).
On the centralization of power under Xi Jinping, see Sangkuk Lee, An
Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power, 26 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 325, 326 (2017) (examining Xi Jinping’s centralization of political power);
Kjeld Erik Bordsgaard, China’s Political Order under Xi Jinping: Concepts and
Perspectives, 16 CHINA: AN INT’L. J. 1, 14–18 (2018) (arguing that power has
been centralized and party authority over the state has increased under Xi and
noting contrast with the less top-heavy, less hierarchically organized, and less
Leninist order earlier in the reform era under Deng Xiaoping).
113
Xi, supra note 63 (stating that Xi issued instructions on control and prevention
of the epidemic at a January 7 Politburo Standing Committee meeting and special
instructions on January 20); see also STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. PRC, supra note
14, at § II.1 (providing official timeline of events).
114
See, e.g., Amy Qin, China’s Leader, Under Fire, Says He Led Coronavirus
Fight Early On, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/world/asia/xi-china-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/AZ2V-QRRH] (examining the backlash that resulted from
statements of Xi Jinping); Chun Han Wong, Beijing Portrays President Xi
Jinping as Hero of Coronavirus Fight, WALL ST. J. ( Mar. 8, 2020, 10:34 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-portrays-president-as-hero-of-coronavirusfight-11583678054 [https://perma.cc/CK2Q-KWFR] (examining how Chinese
authorities presented Xi Jinping’s efforts to contain the spread of coronavirus);
Wong et al., supra note 62 (describing assessments of implications of whether Xi
and top leadership knew of epidemic at earliest phases or learned only later
because of local officials’ concealment); Opinion, What Did Xi Jinping Know
About the Coronavirus, and When Did He Know It?, WASH. POST, ( Feb. 19,
2020, 6:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/globalopinions/what-did-xi-jinping-know-about-the-coronavirus-and-when-did-heknow-it/2020/02/19/35482fe2-5340-11ea-b119-4faabac6674f_story.html
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STRENGTHS OF THE SYSTEM: MOBILIZING TO
CONTAIN THE EPIDEMIC
Once centrally mandated efforts to contain COVID-19 began,
they were formidable and effective—as well as draconian. Success
was achieved through the regime’s extraordinary ability to mobilize
people and resources on a massive, national scale. 115 Tens of
thousands of medical personnel and large stores of equipment
(including PPE from rapidly ramped-up production) were dispatched
to Wuhan, and elsewhere in Hubei, including through a system that
paired supplier provinces with recipient Hubei cities. Basic,
temporary hospitals were constructed within two weeks after the
lockdown was imposed. 116 Teams composed of, or under the
direction of, government staff were dispatched within neighborhoods
and apartment blocks to conduct health checks, provide daily
necessities, impose isolation and quarantine, erect barriers, and
conduct contact tracing. Special fangcang—shelter—hospitals were
(discussing the potential timeline of when Xi Jinping became aware of the
coronavirus).
115
For an overall account of these responses, see STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF.
PRC, supra note 14, §§ III.3–III.4.
116
See Chai Minyi (柴敏懿), Quanguo Gong Pai 4.2 Wan Yihurenyuan Zhiyuan
Wuhan, Qizhong Hushi 2.86 Wan Ming (全国共派 4.2 万医护人员支援武汉，
其中护士 2.86 万名) [A Total of 42,000 Medical Personnel were Sent to Support
Wuhan, including 28,600 Nurses], PEOPLE’S DAILY; PENGPAI (澎湃) [THE PAPER]
(Feb. 29, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_6236796
[https://perma.cc/ZZ6X-787Y] (“A total of 42,000 medical personnel were sent to
support Wuhan, including 28,600 nurses”); China Mobilizes Medical Teams to
Fight New Coronavirus, XINHUA (Jan. 24, 2020, 10:28 PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/24/c_138731835.htm
[https://perma.cc/DAP8-ZDXS] (describing dispatch of medical teams and rapid
hospital construction); Wen Jicong & Deng Hao (温济聪 & 邓浩), Pingfan
Yingxiong, Wuxian Rongguang—Ji Wuhan Huoshenshan, Leishenshan Yiyuan de
Jianshezhe he Weihuzhe Men (平凡英雄，无限荣光—记武汉火神山、雷神山
医院的建设者和维保者们) [On the Heroic Actions by Workers Who Constructed
the Temporary Hospitals in Wuhan], XINHUA (Apr. 6, 2020, 12:16:42 PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-04/06/c_1125818508.htm
[https://perma.cc/CS93-QBWN] (describing rapid hospital construction); Alex
Jingwei He et al., Crisis Governance, Chinese Style: Distinctive Features of
China’s Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, 3 POL’Y DESIGN & PRAC. 242, 249–
250 (2020) (describing provincial “pairings” with Hubei cities as resource
mobilization method).
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established to remove not-seriously-ill patients from the general
population. 117 Similar methods were employed in other hotspots,
including Beijing. 118 In terms of funds expended and economic
activity foregone, the cost of these undertakings was very high.
By early March, Chinese authorities declared the outbreak in
Wuhan and Hubei “curbed,” and an easing of travel bans and other
restrictions on activities soon followed.” 119 By the end of November
2020, the reported death toll nationwide was under 5000 and the
official number of cases was under 100,000, with consistently low
new case rates after early March and infection and death rates very
far below global averages.120 China’s statistics have met with some
skepticism abroad. Undercounting COVID-19 infections and
fatalities has been a problem in many countries. 121 But critics have
117

See sources cited supra note 26 on travel restrictions. Simiao Chen et al,
Fangcang Shelter Hospitals:A Novel Concept for Responding to Public Health
Emergencies, 395 LANCET 1305, 1305–306 (2020) (describing the creation of
shelter hospitals).
118
See, e.g., Gerry Shih, Locked Down in Beijing, I Watched China Beat Back the
Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Mar 16, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/locked-down-in-beijing-iwatched-china-beat-back-the-coronavirus/2020/03/16/f839d686-6727-11ea-b1993a9799c54512_story.html [https://perma.cc/6PCR-J6WR]; Shi Jingtao, Beijing
and Shanghai Impose New Controls on Residents as China Battles to Contain
Coronavirus, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3049891/beijing-and-shanghaiimpose-new-controls-residents-china-battles [https://perma.cc/YX2J-BZ3U].
119
Stephen McDonell, Coronavirus: China Says Disease ‘Curbed’ in Wuhan and
Hubei, BBC, (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china51813876 [https://perma.cc/Q3XK-JXBR] (describing comments by Xi Jinping
that the virus was “basically curbed in Wuhan and Hubei); STATE COUNCIL INFO.
OFF. PRC, supra note 14, §§ I.2–I.3; China Publishes Timeline on COVID-19,
supra note 19.
120
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY CORONAVIRUS RESOURCE CENTER,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/china [https://perma.cc/TZ2P-ABKY] (last
vistied Dec. 8, 2020); Covid World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-maps.html
[https://perma.cc/W293-CFL8].
121
Daniel Michaels, Extent of Covid-19 Deaths Failed to be Captured by Most
Countries, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mostcountries-fail-to-capture-extent-of-covid-19-deaths-11590658200
[https://perma.cc/7FZ2-DWET] (reporting undercounting of cases and deaths in
many countries, including U.S. and China); Raffaele Vardavas, Courtney A.
Gidengil & Sarah A. Nowak, Estimates of COVID-19’s Fatality Rate Might
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argued that China seriously understated the damage that COVID-19
wrought in Wuhan and elsewhere (a view partly borne out by leaked
documents and an official upward revision of early counts)—
especially concerning deaths during the early weeks of the
epidemic—and have challenged the accuracy of China’s reported
COVID statistics more generally.122 As illustrated by the June 2020
outbreak in a Beijing wholesale food market, cases in Qingdao a few
months later (prompting a massive, city-wide testing initiative), and
resurgence of case counts in many other places around the world
where the virus had seemed under control, success can be
precarious. 123 Notwithstanding these caveats and doubts, China’s
Change. And Then Change Again, RAND BLOG (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/03/estimates-of-covid-19s-fatality-rate-mightchange-and.html [https://perma.cc/UY5L-TJ28] (infection cases undercounted
globally, leading to overestimate of case fatality rate).
122
See, e.g., Amy Qin, China Raises Coronavirus Death Toll by 50% in Wuhan,
N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/world/asia/china-wuhan-coronavirus-deathtoll.html [https://perma.cc/V8NM-7TEQ] (discussing the lack of full transparency
by the Chinese government regarding Coronavirus death tolls); Walsh, supra note
5 (presenting leaked documents indicating February 10 case count was two times
official report’s tally); Elaine Okanyene Nsoesie et al., Analysis of Hospital
Traffic and Search Engine Data in Wuhan China Indicates Early Disease Activity
in the Fall of 2019, HARV. LIBR. OFF. SCHOLARLY COMMC’N (2020),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/42669767/Satellite_Images_Baidu_C
OVID19_manuscript_DASH.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/FUC5-8ASB] 3–5; Charlie Campbell & Amy Gunia, China Says
It's Beating Coronavirus. But Can We Believe Its Numbers?, TIME (Apr. 1, 2020,
8:54 AM), https://time.com/5813628/china-coronavirus-statistics-wuhan/
[https://perma.cc/KM7R-MZPW]; Julian E. Barnes, C.I.A. Hunts for Authentic
Virus Totals in China, Dismissing Government Tallies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/us/politics/cia-coronaviruschina.html [https://perma.cc/97MZ-E75D] (expressing or describing skepticism
about China’s representations regarding its containment of the virus).
123
See Anna Fifield & Lyric Li, Beijing Goes Into ‘Wartime Mode’ as virus
emerges at market, WASH. POST (June 13, 2020, 3:08 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/beijing-goes-into-wartime-mode-asvirus-emerges-at-market-in-chinese-capital/2020/06/13/65c5aac8-ad40-11ea868b-93d63cd833b2_story.html [https://perma.cc/H6BU-ZUYH]; China’s
Qingdao Tests 11 Million after Local COVID-19 Cases Emerge, XINHUA (Oct.
15, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-10/15/c_139442983.htm
[https://perma.cc/7HCE-YFHF]; Andrew Witty and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala,
Resurgence of Covid-19 in Many Countries Underscores How Vulnerable Billions
of People Are, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 3, 2020),
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containment efforts were notably successful by international
standards and severe recurrences have been avoided into the final
months of 2020.
China’s legal framework for responding to public health
emergencies and infectious disease outbreaks reflects an appreciation
of what is needed to handle the daunting challenges of governance
that COVID-19 and similar threats pose. Although too often evaded
or less than zealously followed in the initial phases of the pandemic,
the laws and rules that called for energetic monitoring, reporting, and
investigating still were part of the story behind taking the necessary
first steps toward—and the subsequent unfolding of—the large-scale,
center-driven response. Some aspects of making the outbreak known
to higher-level public health authorities, conducting on-the-ground
investigations, and informing the public paralleled what the laws
contemplated (although sometimes belatedly and grudgingly, to the
frustration of many, including the expert teams sent to Wuhan and
higher-level authorities) And departures from legal requirements
were criticized and sometimes sanctioned. 124 Many of the more
dramatic moves undertaken in Wuhan and elsewhere in late January
and early February tracked provisions in laws authorizing the
imposition of isolation and quarantine, suspension of travel,
addressing and eliminating animal sources of human disease
outbreaks, provision of medical and other support and assistance, and
so on.125
The ability to direct vast state and societal, human and
material, resources to pursue the regime’s high-priority goals—as
occurred in Wuhan and elsewhere in China during the COVID-19
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/10/03/resurgence-covid-19-manycountries-underscores-vulnerable-billions/ [https://perma.cc/GN6E-3KMB].
124
See supra discussion accompanying note 119. See also generally STATE
COUNCIL INFO. OFF. P.R.C., supra note 14, §§ I.2–I.3.
125
See, e.g., Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 20, 40, 42–45
(authorizing relevant level people’s government to undertake necessary
prevention and control measures, including but not limited to isolating potential
sources of infection, suspending economic and social activities and transportation
in and out of affected areas, eliminating animal sources of disease); Emergency
Response Law, supra note 29, arts. 45, 49 (authorizing relevant level people’s
government to muster and deploy resources, shutdown places and activities, and
take other necessary prevention, control, and protection measures in the event of
Level 1 or 2 emergency, and to provide treatment, control sources of danger, and
isolate dangerous sites and areas in the event of a public health incident).
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crisis—reflects strengths of Chinese governance and China’s
administrative state, despite the weaknesses evident in the early
response to the novel coronavirus outbreak. 126 China has, in the
parlance of comparative politics, a highly capable state, with
institutions robust enough to govern society, manage politics, and
extract and deploy resources effectively. 127 The regime’s formidable
capacity derives in part from a system of one-party authoritarian rule,
a preeminent leader, an in-principle unitary state, and mutually
reinforcing party and state structures of top-down hierarchical
authority and discipline.128

126

Yanzhong Huang, China’s Public Health Response to the COVID-19
Outbreak, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR (June 1, 2020),
https://www.prcleader.org/huang [https://perma.cc/B5QP-ANAY];
Emma Graham-Harrison & Lily Kuo, China's coronavirus lockdown strategy:
brutal but effective, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2020, 1:07 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/chinas-coronavirus-lockdownstrategy-brutal-but-effective [https://perma.cc/C4NU-FVMH]; He et al, supra
note 116 (analyzing Chinese regime’s mobilizational capacities and methods in
crisis conditions). But cf. Yasheng Huang, No, Autocracies Aren't Better for
Public Health, B. REV. (Apr. 14, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/politics-globaljustice/yasheng-huang-no-autocracies-arent-better-public-health
[https://perma.cc/EG3R-2S4S] (arguing that the autocratic elements in China’s
response to COVID-19 have hindered efforts to contain the virus and make the
situation worse).
127
For the classic statement of the importance of state capacity to political order
and regime success, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN
CHANGING SOCIETIES 1 (1968) (“The most important political distinction among
countries is not their form of government but their degree of government.”). On
China as a capable state, see, e.g., DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE
LEVIATHAN (2004) (analyzing success of government institutional reforms as
means to sustained growth, political stability, and addressing corruption); World
Governance Indicators, 2018, WORLD BANK,
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governanceindicators [https://perma.cc/EG5D-NF4W] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (ranking
China at 71.6th percentile globally on “government effectiveness” and at 42.8th
percentile on “regulatory quality”).
128
See generally HUNTINGTON, supra note 127, 335–343 (characterizing
communist and Leninist systems as highly institutionalized and therefore
politically effective); PHILIP SELZNICK, THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON 1–16
(1952) (characterizing Leninist structures as an effective “organizational
weapon”); see also Jacques deLisle, Law in the China Model 2.0: Legality,
Developmentalism and Leninism under Xi Jinping, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 66,
75–76, 79 (2017) (concerning Leninist features of law in China during Xi era).
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For China, success in containing the coronavirus (as in
pursuing many other difficult policy priorities) depended on—among
other things—overcoming the challenges of fragmentation and the
difficulties of implementation on a mammoth scale. Moves to
suppress COVID-19 in Wuhan, Beijing, and elsewhere (in areas with
a population in the hundreds of millions) and measures to prevent the
disease’s further spread and recurrence necessarily relied on many
actions—and, in many cases, coordinated actions—by numerous
organs of the Chinese state. These included the NHC and CDC,
health commissions and disease control and prevention institutions at
various levels, other public health-related government departments,
public security forces, the Ministry of Transportation (which
collaborated with the NHC and three other government departments
on the “Notice” to prevent transmission of COVID over
transportation networks), local public transport agencies (to limit
access and enforce safety policies on subways and buses), public
works crews (to build physical barriers), the Ministry of Commerce
(to help address supply issues), the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology (for big data and AI tracking measures), the
People’s Liberation Army (to help build temporary hospitals and
provide supplemental medical staff), the Ministry of Education (to
extend school closures beyond the New Year’s holiday, on the orders
of the State Council, and to institute coronavirus screening and
prevention measures in schools), party committees at many levels (to
exhort people and monitor their behavior), and many others.
From formal laws to more ad hoc measures, an emphasis on
creating and using wide-ranging and cross-sectoral mobilizational
capacity is notably pervasive in epidemic and public health-related
contexts.129 The most extraordinary legal provisions (for example,
formally declaring a constitutional “state of emergency”) were not
invoked amid the novel coronavirus outbreak. Short of such
measures, the Emergency Response Law—adopted partly to
implement lessons from SARS—and the Infectious Disease Law—
also revised in the wake of SARS—and other laws explicitly
contemplate a whole-of-government (and whole-of-society)
mobilizational response to public health crises, especially where—as
129

For an argument that the effective response (after the initial missteps) reflects
specifically the strengths in crisis management of the Chinese system, see Swaine,
supra note 46.
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occurred with COVID-19—the highest sub-constitutional level of
emergency (Level 1) and the most serious level of infectious diseasefighting measures (Class A restrictions) are invoked. 130 The
acknowledgement of the importance of coordinating across oftenfragmented units of governance is explicit in such legal provisions.
They set forth the authority of the State Council and provincial and
local governments—as coordinating organs—to require the
mobilization of state and social resources, and the duties of
government units across many functional systems, party-state-linked
residents’ committees, and ordinary citizens and enterprises to
cooperate with such mobilization directives and other governmentled responses to infectious disease outbreaks or public health
emergencies.131 Therein lies a broad, law-embodied imperative for
130

See Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 69 (stating that National
People’s Congress Standing Committee and State Council have the authority to
declare a “state of emergency” as contemplated in the Constitution); see also
deLisle, supra note 8, at 352–56 (discussing distinction between constitutional
state of emergency and lesser forms of emergency response in Chinese law and in
the formulation of the Emergency Response Law).
131
See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 6, 9, 39, 45, 49 (setting forth:
the obligation of departments other than NHC—and their local branches—to
undertake disease control and prevention work within their scope of work; the
obligation of residents’ committees and villagers committee to participate in
disease control and prevention work; obligations of hospitals and medical
institutions in combatting epidemics; the State Council’s and provincial and local
government’s authority to mobilize people, deploy state resources, and requisition
private resources in response to a serious infectious disease outbreak; and the
obligations of producers of essential medical supplies and transportation
services—many of which are government entities—to give priority to work
needed for addressing epidemics); Provisions on Disease Control, supra note 7,
art. 3–4 (emphasizing the principles of “integrated resources” [zhenghe ziyuan]
and “clear allocation of [coordinated] responsibilities” [mingque zhize], and
noting the roles of multiple relevant agencies [youguan bumen] in addressing
infectious disease challenges). See also Emergency Response Law, supra note
29, art. 6, 8, 12, 14, 32, 48–49, 52, 55, 57 (providing that: the state shall establish
social mobilization mechanisms; the State Council or provincial and local
governments shall coordinate and direct responses to emergencies; the PLA shall
participate in emergency response efforts; the state shall secure material and
agreements with enterprises to provide material to address possible emergencies;
the people’s governments shall organize relevant departments and deploy state
and social emergency resources to respond to emergencies, including public
health emergencies; the people’s governments have authority to requisition
property; and residents’ committees and villagers’ committees are obligated to
organize and mobilize citizens and maintain order in emergencies; citizens are
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the coordinating and mobilizational strengths that were on display in
the active phase of the Chinese state response to COVID-19.
Top-level coordination efforts, often invoking formal legal
authority, figured prominently in the response to COVID-19. As the
centrally mandated response began in earnest around January 20,
under the direction of Premier Li and the State Council, the National
Health Commission declared that the novel coronavirus was a Class
B disease under the Infectious Disease Law, and triggered the stricter
measures that the law provided for Class A diseases. This move
appears to have been consistent with the Infectious Disease Law
provisions that contemplate applying Class A measures to specified
Class B diseases (such as SARS, to which COVID-19 was closely
related) and other infectious disease outbreaks of unknown cause for
which the State Council determines Class A-style measures are
warranted.132 A month later, as central authorities moved to adjust
required to obey and assist the government and residents’ committees and
villagers’ committees); Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 3, 32–34,
38, 40 (establishing the obligation of departments of transportation to assure
timely delivery of needed medical materials in emergency; ad hoc
“headquarters/command bodies” authority to mobilize and deploy people and
material, and to exercise power of requisition; the obligation of transportation
operators to cooperate isolating infectious passengers; and the obligation of
residents’ committees and villagers’ committees to assist public health authorities
and other government authorities to address public health emergencies).
132
Sun Meng (孙梦), Jiefeng Zaiji, Li Lanjuan Shouci Pilu Wuhan Fengcheng
Xijie (解封在即，李兰娟首次披露武汉封城细节) [In the End of Lockdown in
Wuhan, Li Lanjuan Disclosed Details of Implementation of the Lockdown for the
First Time], ZHONGGUO YILIAO (中国医疗) [MED.CHINA.COM.CN] (Mar. 27,
2020, 10:17 PM), http://med.china.com.cn/content/pid/167168/tid/1023
[https://perma.cc/Z3EZ-R5EQ]; Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 3–4,
39. Reports attributed the announcement to the State Council itself, whereas the
Infectious Disease Law contemplates announcement by the NHC after approval
by the State Council of a recommendation from the NHC. The formal
Announcement was issued by the NHC, with a statement that it was approved by
the State Council, as contemplated under the law. Guojia Weisheng Jiankangwei
Huitong Xiangguan Bumen Lianfang Liankong Quanli Yingdui Xinxing
Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing (国家卫生健康委会同相关部门
联防联控 全力应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情) [National Health
Commission of the People’s Republic of China and Relevant Departments Joint
Prevention and Control Mechanism: All-Out Efforts to Combat COVID-19
Epidemic], STATE COUNCIL P.R.C.(Jan. 21, 2020),
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/yjb/s7860/202001/d9570f3a52614113ae0093df51509684.
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measures to the evolving challenges, a formal Notice on Further
Differentiated, Region-Specific, and Tiered Control and Prevention
was issued pursuant to the State Council’s capacious regulatory
authority to address epidemics and public health emergencies—a
pattern broadly paralleled by lower-tier state units in their roles in an
“all hands” response.133
In an early February speech to the Politburo Standing
Committee, Xi asserted the importance of a law-based approach to
epidemic control and prevention, calling for increased public
attention and adherence to the Infectious Disease Law and other laws,
and for using the law to punish officials’ dereliction of duty, and any
criminal activities that impeded the pandemic response or took
advantage of pandemic conditions. 134 In that speech and other
remarks, Xi argued that it was important to pursue pandemic
prevention and control “according to law” and to “follow the path of
the rule of law” in such work. 135 The State Council White Paper
recounting the first months of the response to COVID-19 stated,
without details, that the Infectious Disease Law and implementing
measures had been “strictly followed,” reported that the authorities
had addressed incidents of fraud and other crimes committed in
connection with trade in PPE and other matters, and asserted, rather
obliquely, that “legal disputes associated with the epidemic” had been
“resolved in accordance with law.”136

shtml; Announcement of the National Health Commission of the People's
Republic of China, 2020 No.1, supra note 23.
133
See, e.g., the Notice issued jointly by the NHC, the Ministry of Transportation,
and three other government units discussed earlier in this subsection.
134
Xi Stresses Law-based Infection Prevention, Control, XINHUA (Feb. 5, 2020),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/05/c_138758782.htm
[https://perma.cc/9TBQ-7GNG]; Xi, supra note 63.
135
Xi Jinping, Quanmian tigao yifa fang kong yifa zhili nengli, jianquan guojia
gonggong weisheng yingji guanli tixi (全面提高依法防控依法治理能力,健全国
家公共卫生应急管理体系) [Comprehensively Improving Law-Based Epidemic
Prevention and Control and the National Public Health Emergency Management
System], QIUSHI (求是) [CPC CENT. COMM. BIMONTHLY] (May 2020),
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-02/29/c_1125641632.htm
[https://perma.cc/S3J9-4HSM] (reprinting several Xi speeches from February).
136
STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. PRC, supra note 14, § II; see also Regulations on
Responses, supra note 31, art. 52 (concerning criminal penalties for offenses in
the context of public health emergency).
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To address the COVID-19 epidemic, the Chinese leadership
also turned to other organizational fixes that long had been in the
repertoire of governance for addressing urgent problems. New
bodies were established by late January with responsibilities for
overseeing, coordinating, and steering the response across otherwise
possibly fractious or sluggish units. One major example was the State
Council’s Joint Control and Prevention Mechanism. With a
leadership role for Vice Premier Sun Chunlan (whose preexisting
portfolio included oversight responsibility for the NHC), it was
charged with coordinating across thirty-two specified sectors. This
approach was reprised at lower levels in Wuhan and other localities,
where novel coronavirus epidemic control and prevention emergency
headquarters were set up.137 Such arrangements, too, resonated with
relevant laws’ mandates for establishing task-specific “headquarters”
or “command bodies” [zhihui bu/zhihui jigou] under the State
Council or lower-level governments to respond to public health
emergencies, including serious infectious disease outbreaks. 138
Another key example was the establishment of a party-based
“leading small group” [lingdao xiaozu]. One of many such subject
matter-based elite ad hoc entities created during Xi’s tenure (and
echoing a similar move undertaken in the 2003 response to SARS,
but with a lessened role for public health experts), the Central
Leading Small Group for Work to Counter the New Coronavirus
Epidemic was announced immediately after the lockdown began in
137

STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. PRC, supra note 14, § II.1; STATE COUNCIL PRC,
supra note 132; Yan Ning et al., China's Model to Combat the COVID-19
Epidemic: A Public Health Emergency Governance Approach, 5 GLOB. HEALTH
RSCH. & POL’Y. (July 14, 2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7358318/
[https://perma.cc/TM72-77V3]. On the operation of the Wuhan headquarters, see
Anna Fifield & Lena H. Sun, Travel Ban Goes Into Effect in Chinese City of
Wuhan as Authorities Try to Stop Coronavirus Spread, WASH. POST (Jan. 22,
2020, 11:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/nine-deadas-chinese-coronavirus-spreads-despite-efforts-to-containit/2020/01/22/1eaade72-3c6d-11ea-afe2-090eb37b60b1_story.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5HB-NPX3].
138
See Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 8 (authorizing ad hoc
headquarters/command body under State Council and lower-level governments to
handle responses to emergencies); Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art.
3 (specifying State Council’s “headquarters” or “command body” roles in
responding to public health emergency).
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Wuhan and was chaired by Premier Li Keqiang—who, as the head of
the State Council, also oversaw the Joint Control and Prevention
Mechanism, manifesting the close integration of party and
government authority at the top levels of the Chinese system.139 A
leading small group was established within the central NHC structure
as well. Throughout, Xi and others among the top leadership
repeatedly stressed the importance of following rules and directives
issued on behalf of central party and state authorities.
At times, the response to COVID also resonated with other,
more heavily political and less institutionalized means that were often
employed in an earlier time in the history of the P.R.C. Although the
Reform Era that began in 1978 brought a sharp turn away from the
“campaign” mode of governance that characterized the Mao era and
some of its most disruptive excesses, the notion of pursuing a heroic
fight against an abstract enemy echoed, albeit faintly, in the fight
against epidemic diseases in the first decades of the twenty-first
century.140 During SARS, China’s then-top leader Hu Jintao spoke
of an unrelenting “people’s war” by “the whole nation” under “strong
and correct” party leadership against the viral enemy. 141 Such
139

Wen-Hsun Tsai & Wang Zhou, Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of
Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics, 82 CHINA J. 1, 1 (2019) (discussing
how leading small groups operate to “integrat[e] the interests
and opinions of various government and Party departments”); Li Keqiang,
Premier of the State Council, Chairs a Meeting of the Central Committee's
Leading Group on Responding to the Pneumonia Outbreak Caused by the Novel
Coronavirus (Excerpts), EMBASSY OF THE P.R.C. IN THE U.S. (Feb. 5, 2020),
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t1740693.htm [https://perma.cc/BM7LNDX7]; John Dotson, The CCP’s New Leading Small Group for Countering the
Coronavirus Epidemic—and the Mysterious Absence of Xi Jinping, JAMESTOWN
FOUND. (Feb. 5, 2020, 4:51 PM), https://jamestown.org/program/the-ccps-newleading-small-group-for-countering-the-coronavirus-epidemic-and-themysterious-absence-of-xi-jinping/ [https://perma.cc/6LHC-8LUH].
140
See Elizabeth J. Perry, From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns:
“Constructing a New Socialist Countryside,” in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND: THE
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 30, 31–32
(Elizabeth J. Perry & Sebastian Heilmann eds., 2011) (arguing that post-Mao,
Chinese leaders did not abandon the campaign mode of governance but rather
shifted from revolutionary campaigns to managed ones that fit within a
framework emphasizing technology and rationalization). See generally GORDON
BENNETT, YUNDONG: MASS CAMPAIGNS IN CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
(1976) (providing a history and overview of campaigns in China).
141
deLisle, supra note 6, at 598 (quoting People’s Daily).
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language was less prominent in the early effort against COVID, but
it was not absent. In late January, for example, Xi, too, referred to
the fight against the epidemic as a “people’s war”142 and called the
coronavirus a “devil” that his administration “will not let hide.”143
During and after the initial emergency response, Chinese
authorities were able to rely on a robust apparatus of old-style, laborintensive methods, and new-fangled, high-tech means for monitoring
and constraining the behavior of citizens to prevent the spread and
reemergence of COVID-19. The ubiquitous guards at the entrances
to apartment blocks enforced prohibitions on entry and exit. Bounties
were offered for reporting neighbors’ violations of COVID
containment rules. Prosecutors’ offices encouraged citizens to
inform them—including through the “letters and visits” [xinfang]
system that went remote and online amid the pandemic—of COVIDrisk-creating unlawful behavior. 144 Residents’ committees [shequ
142

Xi, supra note 63; see also Notice, supra note 102 (referring to the response to
COVID-19 as a war).
143
Zeng Rong, Embassy Spokesperson’s Letter to the Economist on its Unjustified
Comments on China’s Fight against the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic, EMBASSY
OF CHINA IN THE U.K. (Feb. 21, 2020), http://www.chineseembassy.org.uk/eng/PressandMedia/t1748533.htm [https://perma.cc/FP3LHHAU]; see also He et al, supra note 116, at 251-252 (describing use of “war
narrative” in mobilization to address COVID-19).
144
Emily Feng & Amy Cheng, Restrictions And Rewards: How China Is Locking
Down Half A Billion Citizens, NPR (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/02/21/806958341/restrictionsand-rewards-how-china-is-locking-down-half-a-billion-citizens
[https://perma.cc/RJ8D-9KTG]; Jeremy Page, China’s Progress Against
Coronavirus Used Draconian Tactics Not Deployed in the West, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 24, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-ismisinterpreting-wuhans-coronavirus-progressand-drawing-the-wrong-lessons11585074966 [https://perma.cc/5GKT-RYPF]; Brenda Goh & Thomas Suen, In
China, walled up Wuhan awaits life beyond the barricades, REUTERS (Mar. 28,
2020, 8:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-wuhanbarricades/in-china-walled-up-wuhan-awaits-life-beyond-the-barricadesidUSKBN21G0I9
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200331071605if_/https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-health-coronavirus-wuhan-barricades/in-china-walled-up-wuhan-awaits-lifebeyond-the-barricades-idUSKBN21G0I9]; Shouli Qunzhong Xinfang de Qudao
Shizhong Changtong Jiancha Jiguan Kongshen Bumen Yiqing Fangkong Qijian
Banli Xinfang Yinghuijinhui (受理群众信访的渠道始终畅通检察机关控申部门
疫情防控期间办理信访应回尽回) [The Mass Petitioning System Shall Remain
Available and Responsive to the Public to the Extent Possible], CHINA PEACE
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jumin weiyuanhui]—an extra-governmental body under party-state
leadership created early in the PRC’s history to establish control at
very local levels in cities—were tasked with enforcing quarantine and
isolation orders, securing necessary supplies for people under
lockdown, and intensively monitoring citizens’ behavior and health
status. 145 COVID containment efforts also relied on a ubiquitous
“grid” system (established after 2013 to provide more proactive urban
social management) that, in the case of Wuhan, divided the city into
10,000 units, with staffing reinforced amid the outbreak by the
redeployment of more than 40,000 municipal government staff, to
conduct monitoring, transmit directives and information, and provide
resources to citizens.146 Many of these measures had foundations in
various laws and regulations, including those that formally gave
governmental and other entities expansive authority—and imposed
extensive duties on medical institutions, enterprises and citizens to

(Feb. 17, 2020), http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c54219/202002/17/content_12324490.shtml [https://perma.cc/9E67-P7NY].
145
Judith Audin, Governing Through the Neighborhood Community (shequ) in
China, 65 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 85 (2015); Toby Lincoln,
The Urban History That Makes China’s Coronavirus Lockdown Possible,
CONVERSATION (Mar. 3, 2020, 7:44 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-urbanhistory-that-makes-chinas-coronavirus-lockdown-possible-132616
[https://perma.cc/9FKK-575P]; Wang Wenwen, Neighborhood Committees are in
the Vanguard of Virus Control, GLOB. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020, 9:43 PM),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1184356.shtml [https://perma.cc/T9YNALDS]; How Does China Combat Coronavirus: 7,148 Residential Communities
in Wuhan Are on Lockdown, XINHUA (Mar. 11, 2020, 7:49 PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-03/11/c_138867074.htm
[https://perma.cc/T36Q-WZ4K]; Raymond Zhong & Paul Mozur, To Tame
Coronavirus, Mao-Style Social Control Blankets China, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/business/china-coronaviruslockdown.html [https://perma.cc/T7CK-7L7Y].
146
See, e.g., Community Grid System Helps China Fight Virus, infra note 155;
Willaim Zheng & Kristin Huang, Street by Street, Home by Home: How China
Used Social Controls to Tame an Epidemic, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 20,
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3080912/wuhanselderly-reminded-life-under-mao-during-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/94GRYX5N]; William Zheng, Grass-Roots Officials Take Lead Role on the Front Line
of Wuhan’s Grid-by-Grid Battle Against Coronavirus, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3075453/grass-roots-officialstake-lead-role-front-line-wuhans-grid-grid [https://perma.cc/TF23-BP57].
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cooperate—in responding to infectious disease epidemics and public
health emergencies.147
Especially in cities that were not fully locked down and as
closed-down areas began to reopen, state authorities deployed
formidable resources for testing, tracing, and containing COVID
cases. China’s highly digitized and online urban society (where
people rely on mobile phone-based apps for a vast range of daily
activities and transactions), pervasive networks of cameras and
sensors, extensive use of facial recognition technology, and artificial
intelligence combined to provide potent means for combatting the
virus’s spread.148 Big data tools were used to identify probabilities
of outbreaks and mobility patterns that could lead to spread, and guide
decisions to impose or lift restrictions. 149 More individual-targeting
147

See the many provisions cited in note 131. For example, there was, at least
arguably, an affirmative legal basis for assigning such roles to the residents’
committees. See, e.g., Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 9 (providing
that residents’ committees are responsible for organizing residents to participate
in control and prevention of infection diseases); Emergency Response Law, supra
note 29, arts. 55, 57 (providing that residents’ committees are to undertake
publicity and mobilizational measures to respond to an emergency situation).
148
To Curb Covid-19, China is Using its High-tech Surveillance Tools,
ECONOMIST (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.economist.com/china/2020/02/29/tocurb-covid-19-china-is-using-its-high-tech-surveillance-tools
[https://perma.cc/Z2F4-XH74]; Yingzhi Yang & Julie Zhu, Coronavirus Brings
China's Surveillance State out of the Shadows, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2020, 7:20 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-surveillance/coronavirus-bringschinas-surveillance-state-out-of-the-shadows-idUSKBN2011HO
[https://perma.cc/2K3J-VKZA]; Amy Gadsden, The Post-COVID-19 Future of
Surveillance in China, PENN GLOBAL (May 20, 2020),
https://global.upenn.edu/perryworldhouse/news/post-covid-19-futuresurveillance-china [https://perma.cc/K784-E5NU]; Nicholas Wright, Coronavirus
and the Future of Surveillance, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-04-06/coronavirus-and-futuresurveillance [https://perma.cc/JSR4-UWCQ]; Shawn Yuan, How China is Using
AI and Big Data to Fight the Coronavirus, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 1, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/01/how-china-is-using-ai-and-big-datato-fight-the-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/42TT-Z234].
149
See Rajib Shaw, Yong-kyun Kim & Jinling Hua, Governance, Technology and
Citizen Behavior in Pandemic: Lessons from COVID-19 in East Asia, 6
PROGRESS DISASTER SCI. 1, 8 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100090 [https://perma.cc/WG5J-QRZL]; see
also Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019
(Covid-19), at 15, WHO (DATE) https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-Covid-19-final-report.pdf
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tools included taking the temperatures of people entering factories,
office buildings and schools,150 scanning QR codes to check the “red,
yellow, or green” health status of people seeking to use public
transportation,151 tracking down travelers who had been on trains and
planes with infected fellow passengers, and tracing the contacts of
people who were determined to be infected. 152 Chinese media carried
striking reports of people wanted by the authorities turning
themselves in because life on the lam had become so difficult amid
COVID-driven restrictions on mobility for those who could not
obtain the necessary digital permissions. 153
Legal underpinnings for some of the more intrusive
monitoring measures are relatively attenuated and problematic. The
principal and most accepted bases are the provisions in the Infectious
Disease Law that direct disease control and prevention organs (with
an underlying planning role for local governments and the NHC and
local HCs) to “monitor/undertake surveillance” [jiance] of infectious
diseases and outbreaks of infectious diseases. 154 More specific
operational directives to conduct tracking and tracing of people who
have COVID-19 and their close contacts, and to use artificial
intelligence and big data, as well as extensive low-tech/laborintensive “grid” surveillance, to contain or prevent spread are
contained in a variety “normative documents” [guifanxing wenjian]
or “departmental work documents” [bumen gongzuo wenjian] that do
[https://perma.cc/DST3-EB7U] (crediting use of big data and AI for playing a
significant role in China’s response).
150
Coco Feng, Coronavirus: AI Firms Deploy Fever Detection Systems in Beijing
to Fight Outbreak, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3049215/ai-firms-deploy-feverdetection-systems-beijing-help-fight-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/CA7F-LJHB].
151
Paul Mozur et al., In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives Citizens a Color Code,
With Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirussurveillance.html [https://perma.cc/NG5T-9WHX].
152
Yuan, supra note 148; see also STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. PRC, supra note
14, § II.5.
153
24 Nian Sharenfan Mei Lüma Zishou; Pandian Yiqingqi Zishou de Taofanmen
(24 年杀人犯没绿码自首 盘点疫情期自首的逃犯们) [24-Year Murder
Criminal On-the-Run Surrenders Voluntarily Due to Not Possessing Safety Code,
A Count of Criminals Turning Themselves in During the Pandemic], SINA NEWS
(May 5, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://zx.sina.cn/2020-05-05/zxiircuyvi1370445.d.html [https://perma.cc/A2US-GHX7].
154
See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 7. 17–18, 20.
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not have the force of law and are issued by the State Council’s Joint
Control and Prevention Mechanism or the NHC. 155 The absence of a
more clear and robust legal basis has been a source of concern,
especially because the measures used for tracking, tracing, and
surveilling can involve or lead to coercive measures and entail
significant intrusions on personal rights. 156

155

See, e.g., Guowuyuan Yingdui Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan
Yiqing Lianfang Liankong Jizhi (国务院应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情联
防联控机制) [The State Council Mechanism for the Joint Control and Prevention
of Pneumonia Epidemic Caused by the Novel Coronavirus Infection], Feiyan
Jizhi Fa (2020) 9 Hao (肺炎机制发〔2020〕9 号) [Distributed by the
Mechanism (2020) No. 9]; Guanyu Yinfa Jinqi Fangkong Xinxing Guangzhuang
Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Gongzuo Fangan de Tongzhi (关于印发近期防控新型
冠状病毒感染的肺炎工作方案的通知) [Notice on Printing and Distributing the
Work Plan for the Prevention and Control of Pneumonia Caused by the Novel
Coronavirus Infection in the Near Future], (Jan. 27, 2020), §§ 1, 2(2) (concerning
use of big data, grid surveillance, and artificial intelligence in responding to the
noval coronavirus); Nat’l Health Comm’n PRC, Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu
Ganran de Feiyan Fangkong Fangan (Dierban) (新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防控
方案(第二版)) [Pneumonia Prevention and Control Plan for Novel Coronavirus
Infection (2nd Ed.)] (Jan. 22, 2020), §§ 3(2)(1), 3(6) (concerning contact tracing);
Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Lianfang Liankong Jizhi (国务院
应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情联防联控机制) [The State Council
Mechanism for the Joint Control and Prevention of Pneumonia Epidemic Caused
by the Novel Coronavirus Infection], Feiyan Jizhi Fa (2020) 5 Hao (肺炎机制发
〔2020〕5 号) [Distributed by the Mechanism (2020) No. 5], Guanyu Jiaqiang
Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Shequ Fangkong
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于加强新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情社区防控工作
的通知) [Mechanism for the Joint Control and Prevention of Pneumonia
Epidemics in Response to Novel Coronavirus Infection, Notice on Strengthening
Community Control and Prevention of Pneumonia Epidemics of Novel
Coronavirus Infection] (Jan. 24, 2020), §§ 2(1)(3), 2(2)(2–3), 3(3) (concerning
tracking of infected individuals and tracing close contacts). See also Community
Grid System Helps China Fight Virus, GLOB. TIMES (Feb 5. 2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178528.shtml [https://perma.cc/4AQ7B5BB].
156
See Shen Kui (沈岿), Dayi Zhixia Shandai Meiyige Ren de Jiben Quanli (大疫
之下善待每一个人的基本权利) [Protecting Everybody’s Basic Rights Under a
Great Epidemic], CONST. & ADMIN. L. RSCH. CTR. PEKING UNIV. (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FSqrvCo9SkEEfG1apkeE6A [https://perma.cc/FEL8NCRX]; Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), Zai Fazhi Guidao Shang Huajie Gonggong
Weisheng Weiji (在法治轨道上化解公共卫生危机) [Resolve the Public Health
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Finally, in combatting the pandemic, Chinese authorities also
benefited from the absence or weakness of features that have been
barriers to some types of state responses in some other countries. As
a matter of constitutional principle, China is a unitary state in which
powers legitimately exercised by lower-level governments are
delegated at the discretion of the central government and can be
reclaimed or overridden, unlike in a federal constitutional system.157
In practice, extensive powers of governance and policymaking have
devolved to provincial and sub-provincial units, partly as a conscious
strategy during much of the Reform Era. Although the initial reaction
to COVID-19 in Wuhan showed the difficulties that can arise from
local autonomy, central authorities have retained de facto as well as
de jure capacity to reassert control, especially in times of crisis or in
pursuit of high-priority goals, and there has been an overall trend
toward recentralization since Xi Jinping came to power. 158 These
features were reflected in the response to COVID-19. Once the
central leadership moved to implement lockdowns, travel bans, and
pervasive surveillance, its actions were not constrained—nor was its
ultimate responsibility muddled—by notions about subnational
authority or ambiguous allocations of powers and duties between
center and localities.159
Efforts to monitor, trace, and contain COVID-19 cases also
did not face significant limitations from laws or norms protecting
privacy interests. The proper balance between public interests (in the
COVID-19 context, public health interests) and privacy rights (in the
COVID-19 context, data privacy and surveillance-related issues) has
Crisis on Tracks of the Rule of Law], AISIXIANG (爱思想) (Mar. 2, 2020)
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/120415.html [https://perma.cc/4EWJ-F48F].
157
See XIANFA §§ 2–3, 58, 63, 67, 89 (2018); Zhu Suli, Federalism in
Contemporary China–A Reflection on the Allocation of Power between the
Central and Local Government, 7 SINGAPORE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2003).
158
See ZHENG YONGNIAN, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA (2008); Shirk, supra
note 92; Mertha, supra note 28; and supra the discussion accompanying note 112.
159
Connor Boyd, Chinese People are Happiest with their Government’s Handling
of the Covid-19 Pandemic–While the US has Only Fared Slightly Better than
Britain, Poll Claims, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8806987/China-responded-best-Covid19-pandemic-study-claims.html [https://perma.cc/9BGE-UQKX]; Emily Jacobs,
Biden Walks Back National Mask Mandate Over ‘Constitutional Issue,’ N.Y.
POST (Sept. 8, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/09/08/joe-biden-walks-backnational-mask-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/F9VT-7YB3].
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become a focus in legal and policy-relevant discussions in China.160
Especially among urban, educated, and younger-generation Chinese,
“privacy” has become a significant concern in recent times. 161 To the
reported frustration of some public health experts trying to implement
tracking and tracing to manage COVID-19, some Chinese internet
companies resisted providing user information, citing data privacy
concerns.162 But, overall, the regime faced only weak constraints on
these fronts. Legal protections for data privacy, privacy rights more
broadly, and civil liberties still more broadly (including rights not to
be detained in the interest of protecting public health) did not
significantly limit state-mandated measures to fight COVID-19.
Despite significant changes in China in recent years, cultural norms
favoring individual privacy are generally seen as less potent and
central in China than in Western societies, 163 and thus are not likely
to produce effective pressure on the Chinese government and
160

See Shen Kui , The Stumbling Balance between Public Health and Privacy
amid the Pandemic in China, CHINESE J. COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2021)
(discussing the factors that have caused China to “stumble” in finding a proper
balance between public health surveillance and privacy protection).
161
See, e.g., William Yang, How Much Chinese People Care About Privacy?,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/how-much-dochinese-people-care-about-privacy/a-43358120 [https://perma.cc/B2G5-XMVA]
(reporting that generally, Chinese people are concerned with breaches of privacy);
Marc Oliver Rieger et al.; What Do Young Chinese Think about Social Credit?
It’s Complicated, MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINESE STUD. (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://merics.org/en/report/what-do-young-chinese-think-about-social-credit-itscomplicated [https://perma.cc/372C-5VVC] (arguing based on a survey of urban,
young, and educated Chinese respondents that privacy and government
surveillance are major concerns).
162
Peter Hessler, How China Controlled the Coronavirus, NEW YORKER (Aug.
10, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/17/how-chinacontrolled-the-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/RV2Q-ZHV2].
163
See, e.g., Bonnie S. McDougall, Privacy in Modern China, 2 HIST. COMPASS
1, 5–6 (2004) (discussing increase of, but continuing limitations to, concepts of
privacy in society and in official policy and law); Tiffany Li et Zhou Zhoun & Jill
Bronfman, Saving Face: Unfolding the Screen of Chinese Privacy Law, J. L.,
INFO., & SCI., (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3–5) (describing limited concept of
privacy in Chinese culture and implications for Chinese privacy law)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2826087); Kenneth Neil Farrall, Global Privacy
in Flux: Illuminating Privacy Across Cultures in China and the U.S. 2 INT’L J.
COMM. 993, 1005–15 (2008) (describing rising, from low base, popular interest in
and demand for privacy, and legal protections for privacy rights in China); see
also Yang, supra note 161; Rieger et al., supra note 161.
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effective obstacles to its authoritarian methods for coping with a
major crisis.
Although there are reports of popular discontent with some of
the methods the authorities adopted to address the COVID-19
epidemic in China,164 there was no prospect that centrally mandated,
high-priority measures would be compromised by lawsuits
challenging mask requirements or quarantine orders, mass refusals to
install tracking apps or cooperate with contact-tracers, or large-scale
defiance among the public or sub-national officials of state-ordered,
science-based public health directives. The narrow scope and fragile
tolerance for social resistance to legal and policy directives, and the
effective tools that authorities can wield to stifle open opposition,
constrain the possibilities for public action to affect the regime’s
choices. Moreover, many of the measures adopted by the authorities
to counter the pandemic appear to have been accepted as legitimate
by much of the general public.165 Social behavior in much of the
Chinese Mainland paralleled what was found throughout much of
East Asia, from South Korea to Taiwan to Hong Kong to Vietnam,
where there were high levels of public compliance with government
rules and policies to detect, monitor, and contain COVID-19, and
acceptance of restrictions on, or suspension of, ordinary economic
and social activities and liberties.166
164

See, e.g., Anna Fifield, As Coronavirus Goes Global, China’s Xi Asserts
Victory on First Trip to Wuhan Since Outbreak, WASH. POST (Mar 10, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-xi-attempts-acoronavirus-victory-lap-with-visit-to-wuhan/2020/03/10/ca585ddc-6281-11ea8a8e-5c5336b32760_story.html [https://perma.cc/M5MK-9SZU].
165
See, e.g., Cary Wu, How Chinese Citizens View their Government’s
Coronavirus Response, CONVERSATION (June 4, 2020),
https://theconversation.com/how-chinese-citizens-view-their-governmentscoronavirus-response-139176 [https://perma.cc/V7MC-U48M]; She Jingwei,
China Gets Top Marks as Citizens Rank their Governments’ Response to the
COVID-19 Pandemic, CGTN (May 8, 2020), https://news.cgtn.com/news/202005-08/Survey-shows-China-s-response-to-COVID-19-gets-top-mark-amongpublic-Qk5KbpG78k/index.html [https://perma.cc/W4TX-UDSM]; Dan Chen,
China’s Coronavirus Response Could Build Public Support for its Government,
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/27/chinas-coronavirusresponse-could-build-public-support-its-government/ [https://perma.cc/M9J45UB2].
166
See, e.g., Brian Y. An & Shui-Yan Tang, Lessons from COVID-19 Responses
in East Asia, AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. (July 20, 2020),
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REFORMS AHEAD? ADDRESSING WEAKNESSES AND
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT TIME
Several reforms might improve responses to novel
coronavirus-like problems in China. Some signs point to substantial
prospects for reform in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis. Laws
relevant to addressing potential epidemics and public health
emergencies underwent significant revisions after the most closely
analogous prior crisis—the less disruptive and damaging SARS
epidemic in 2003. In June 2020, the government’s White Paper on
the response to COVID-19 noted that the battle against the pandemic
had exposed various “deficiencies in the national response system”
that China would address through measures that were likely to
include legal changes. 167 Two weeks after the lockdown was
imposed in Wuhan, Xi Jinping called for legal reforms, implicitly to
address shortcomings revealed in the COVID-19 response, including
moves to “strengthen construction of the rule of law,” to “revise and
improve” the Infectious Disease Law and the Wild Animal
Conservation Law [Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa], and to enact a new
Biosafety Law (which was promulgated in October 2020 and in
relevant part largely tracks the Infectious Disease Law’s general
provisions on reporting, prevention, and control of infectious
diseases).168 A few months later, Xi called for improvement of the
systems for detecting diseases of unknown origin and assuring
accurate and timely monitoring and reporting of epidemics—an
agenda item that echoed the rationale of the post-SARS creation of
the Direct Reporting System and acknowledged the need for further
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0275074020943707
[https://perma.cc/7ELT-DWGS]; Andrew Sheng & Xiao Geng, How the East
Asian Mind-Set Succeeded with the Coronavirus When Western Individualism
Failed, MKT. WATCH (Aug. 30, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/howthe-east-asian-mind-set-succeeded-with-the-coronavirus-when-westernindividualism-failed-11598561912 [https://perma.cc/TK32-TGT4]; When Culture
Clashes with Covid-19, MIT NEWS (June 25, 2020),
https://news.mit.edu/2020/when-culture-clashes-covid-19-0625
[https://perma.cc/T78X-SR98].
167
STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. P.R.C., supra note 14, § II.
168
Xi, supra note 63. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shengwu Anquanfa (中华
人民共和国生物安全法) [Biosecurity Law of the People's Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 17, 2020,
effective Apr. 15, 2021), arts. 27–33 [hereinafter Biosecurity Law].
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changes in the same vein.169 Still, legal reforms that might achieve
significant change face several considerable, and diverse,
impediments.
First, as such official statements suggest, post-COVID
reforms to laws and rules on preparing for, detecting, and responding
to serious disease outbreaks and other emergencies might address
some of the issues discussed in this article and other assessments of
China’s handling of the novel coronavirus pandemic. Legal reforms
could reduce ambiguities in the content—and the allocation—of the
powers and responsibilities of officials in local governments and in
the central government’s public health and disease control apparatus,
including those related to detecting and disclosing to higher levels or
to the public an outbreak of a potentially serious infectious disease
and the occurrence of a public health emergency. More precise and,
often, narrower mandates for specific officials could ameliorate the
“Spider-Man principle,” and the confusing or perverse incentives that
can affect officials’ responses to early signs of a possible
pandemic. 170 Building on provisions in existing laws, 171 reforms
169

Xi Jinping Calls for Improving Epidemic Monitoring, Early Warning
Capabilities, CGTN (May 25, 2020), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-24/XiJinping-joins-panel-discussion-with-NPC-deputies-from-HubeiQKQwiYvCO4/index.html [https://perma.cc/F2JL-ELFT].
170
See the discussion of the “Spider-Man principle” at supra note 57.
171
See, e.g., Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 24 (stating that all
individuals and entities have right to report on potential public health emergency
to relevant government organ and to report nonfeasance or malfeasance of
relevant government organs to higher level government organs; and granting
awards and prizes for individuals and entities for their meritorious work in
reporting emergencies); Measures for Information Reporting, supra note 36, art.
37 (requiring an individual or entity to report to relevant-level health commission
failure by a reporting entity—such as a medical institution—to make an accurate
report of epidemic or public health emergency).
See also Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 12, 21, 30–31, 37
(establishing the general duty of units and individuals to provide truthful
information on infectious disease incidents; the duty of medical institutions
[jigou] to task staff with reporting on epidemics; and the duty of medical
institutions and staff obligations to report on infectious diseases and on
epidemics); Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, arts. 39, 69 (specifying
citizens’, legal persons’, and organizations’ duty to report emergency situations to
relevant government agency; and sanctions for individuals or entities
disseminating false information about emergency situation or response);
Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, arts. 21, 51 (proscribing individual or
entity delaying or concealing or making false report on public health emergency,
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could give clinicians and hospitals clearer legal rights and duties to
effectuate compliance with the goals of the Direct Reporting System,
including by bypassing their bosses and local governments to give the
CDC, NHC, and other central authorities timely access to vital
information. Rules demanding more extensive and more rapid
disclosures of disease outbreaks and public health emergencies to the
public could increase outside-the-party-state pressure on, and thus
accountability of, local officials. Such reforms could offset somewhat
the incentives that local officials face to focus on upward
accountability to higher-level officials and to succumb to the
temptation to take the “cover up” side of the double-or-nothing bet. 172
If such laws were adopted, challenges would still remain. As
troubled aspects of China’s response to COVID-19 remind us, while
poorly designed laws are likely to lead to failures, even well-designed
laws do not assure success. Difficulties arising from structural
features of the Chinese administrative state, local government, and
the roles of the party can be mitigated only to a limited extent even
by clear and well-crafted laws. As discussed earlier in this article,
there are sound reasons, and enduring appeal, for both tiao and kuai
solutions to problems of Chinese governance.
Notably,
commentators in China made arguments on both sides of the tiao vs.
kuai dilemma when assessing weaknesses in the Emergency
Response Law and the Infectious Disease Law in the immediate
aftermath of the flawed initial response to COVID-19. 173
Effective reform of complex legal frameworks is all the more
difficult when drafters have complex, multifaceted agendas, as they
would here. Managing public health threats remains only one
and specifying sanctions for violations of reporting requirements); Measures for
Information Reporting, supra note 36, arts. 10, 16, 19, 40–41 (setting forth the
responsibilities of medical institutions and staff to report, not to conceal, and not
to make false reports on epidemics or public health emergencies).
172
See Shen, supra note 81, at 34–35 (stating that a reform allowing free
disclosure to the public and free discussion of information about risks would
create sufficient pressure on governments to respond to risks in a timely fashion).
173
See Wang Jun (王俊), 17 Nianhou Yiqing Zaixi, Guanfang Toulu
“Chuanranbing Fangzhifa” Jiang Zaixiu (17 年后疫情再袭，官方透露《传染
病防治法》将再修), XINJING BAO (新京报) [BEIJING NEWS] (Mar. 25, 2020,
9:48:21 PM), http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2020/03/25/708946.html
[https://perma.cc/6MBR-EUKF] (discussing commentators’ arguments for the
strengths and weaknesses of both the tiao and kuai side solutions).
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concern among many for those who design and implement China’s
laws. As noted earlier, it is rarely the top worry. Wuhan officials’
delay in publicly disclosing the threat from the novel coronavirus
apparently partly reflected concerns about triggering public panic and
social disorder. An emphasis on other, traditionally preeminent
concerns—such as restoring economic activity—very quickly
resurfaced as national-level policy priorities a few weeks into the
epidemic once the prevention and control measures appeared to be
effective. Dilemmas arising from conflicting and dissimilar policy
priorities chronically bedevil political decisionmakers, law-drafters,
and regulators everywhere, and China—where their decisions
reshape the rules of a very-high-stakes game of “double or nothing”
bets for officials bearing multiple duties—is certainly no exception.
Another significant obstacle is captured by a common saying
about law in China: zhixing nan—“implementation is hard.”
Difficulty in implementation is a ubiquitous issue, but it is especially
challenging in systems with several features found in China,
including relatively high levels of bureaucratic fragmentation and
vast scale (and therefore more layers of government and more
numerous and far-flung targets of regulation). As many assessments
have noted, the seemingly promising and evidently sincere efforts to
build, partly through legal reforms, a more effective system for
addressing SARS-like challenges floundered in implementation in
the context of the strikingly similar challenges posed by COVID-19.
Second, China could adopt more ambitious laws to address
the origins or sources of potential pandemics. The discussion at the
beginning of this article joins China’s COVID-19 story in its second
chapter, after a tale of earlier failure, including of laws and policies
to regulate and limit the risks of deadly and contagious viruses
crossing into the human population. Public health authorities in
China—and elsewhere—were already well aware that devastating
communicable diseases could cross from wild animals to people, and
that markets selling wild animals for human consumption offered a
dangerously effective pathway (as was recognized to some degree in
pertinent laws). 174 SARS and other infectious diseases emanating

174

See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 25, 42, 75 (concerning control
of infectious diseases transmissible between humans and animals, including
regulation of trade in wild animals).
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from China in recent years had leapt from animals to people through
such vectors, and then spread rapidly and widely. 175
Yet, when COVID-19 emerged, the post-SARS versions of a
principal relevant law—the Wild Animal Conservation Law—still
permitted hunting, trapping, breeding, marketing, sale, and
consumption of animals that were not on the very limited list of
species that authorities had declared rare or endangered and under
“priority conservation” [zhongdian baohu].176 Provided that proper
licenses and certificates are obtained, the law permits trafficking,
including as food for human consumption, of non-domesticated
species that are potential hosts for diseases that could pass to
humans.177 The law also echoes the tiao vs. kuai ambiguities and
tensions of “dual rule” in allocating roles and responsibilities among
units in the central specialized bureaucracy and lower-level
governments that beset emergency response and infectious disease
laws and contributed to the problematic early response to the COVID19 outbreak.178
On January 26, 2020, three days after the lockdown of Wuhan,
the State Administration for Market Regulation, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and the National Forestry and
Grassland Administration—consistent with provisions in the
Infectious Disease Law—issued a joint Notice on Prohibiting Trade
in Wild Animals. The Notice banned the transportation, trading, and
sale of wild animals for human consumption for the duration of the
epidemic, called on local governments and relevant departments to
strengthen inspections, shut down violators and refer serious violators
for criminal prosecution, and encouraged citizens to report illegal

175

Robert G. Webster, Wet Markets—A Continuing Source of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome and Influenza?, 363 LANCET 234. 234–235 (Jan. 17, 2004),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(03)153299/fulltext [https://perma.cc/8FDC-SKZW].
176
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国
野生动物保护法) [Wild Animal Conservation Law of the People's Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 8, 1988,
rev’d Oct. 26, 2018. effective Oct. 26, 2018), arts. 2, 10, 21, 30–33, 44–51
CLI.1.324957(EN) (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Wild Animal Conservation Law].
177
Id. arts. 21–23, 27, 30–33.
178
Id. arts. 7–8, 10–19, 25–28, 34–35.
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trade in wild animals.179 Nearly a month later, on February 24, 2020,
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee—which has
wide-ranging law-making powers—issued a “Decision on
Completely Prohibiting Illegal Trade in Wild Animals, Eliminating
the Bad Habit of Indiscriminately Eating Wild Animals, and
Earnestly Ensuring the Life, Health, and Safety of the People.” 180
The Decision banned hunting, trading, transportation, and use—for
human consumption—of wild species of land animals. It also called
for heavy penalties for violating existing law and directed
governments at all levels to increase supervision, investigation, and
punishment of the prohibited activities. Some local governments
issued even stricter rules.181
179

SHICHANG JIANGUAN ZONGJU (市场监管总局) [STATE ADMIN. FOR MKT.
REGUL.] et al., Guanyu Jinzhi Yesheng Dongwu Jiaoyi de Gonggao (关于禁止野
生动物交易的公告) [Announcement on the Prohibition of Trading in Wild
Aninals] (Jan. 26, 2020) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202001/26/content_5472280.htm [https://perma.cc/2FB7-EME6]; see also Zhang Fan
(张帆), Zhongguo Neidi 31 Shengfen Quanbu Qidong Tufa Gonggong Weisheng
Shijian Yiji Xiangying (中国内地 31 省份全部启动突发公共卫生事件一级响
应), CAIXIN (财新) (Jan. 29, 2020, 10:47 PM), http://china.caixin.com/2020-0129/101509411.html [https://perma.cc/7NB2-EGA9] (concerning national and
provincial measures in response to the novel coronavirus); Infectious Disease
Law, supra note 32, art 25 (authorizing government departments in charge of
agriculture and forestry and other relevant departments to address prevention,
treatment, and control of infectious diseases common to humans and animals).
180
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Quanmian
Jinzhi Feifa Yeshengdongwu Jiaoyi, Gechu Lanshi Yeshengdongwu Louxi,
Qieshi Baozhang Renmin Qunzhong Shengming Jiankang Anquan de Jueding (全
国人民代表大会常务委员会关于全面禁止非法野生动物交易、革除滥食野
生动物陋习、切实保障人民群众生命健康安全的决定) [Decision on
Completely Prohibiting Illegal Trade in Wildlife, Eliminating the Bad Habit of
Indiscriminately Eating Wild Animals, and Earnestly Ensuring the Life, Health,
and Safety of the People] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Feb. 24, 2020, effective Feb. 24, 2020), CLI.1.339750(EN)
(Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Decision on Trade in Wildlife]; China’s Legislature
Adopts Decision on Banning Illegal Trade, Consumption of Wildlife, XINHUA
(Feb. 24, 2020 8:34:59 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202002/24/c_138814328.htm [https://perma.cc/L4L6-4PRN].
181
See, e.g., Bai Yanbing (白岩冰), Hubei Quanmian Jinzhi Shiyong
Yeshengdongwu! (湖北全面禁止食用野生动物) [Hubei Banned Consumption of
Wild Animals Completely], GUOJI JINRONG BAO (国际金融报) [INT’L FIN. NEWS]
(Mar. 7, 2020, 10:15 PM), http://www.ifnews.com/news.html?aid=71030
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The NPC also reportedly decided to fast-track amendments to
several public health and safety laws, including revising the Wild
Animal Conservation Law to make permanent the restrictions on
trade and consumption of wildlife adopted amid the COVID-19
outbreak. But no new amendments were adopted—and further study
was ordered—at the NPC’s 2020 session.182 Initial indications were
that the law would continue to permit marketing and consumption of
many species as part of traditional Chinese medicine—an exception,
critics argued, that would permit public-health-endangering practices
to continue relatively unabated.183
Here, the issue of zhixing nan—implementation is hard—
looms especially large. In addition to the challenges endemic to

[https://perma.cc/42V6-EP4D] (reporting that Hubei banned consumption of wild
animals completely).
182
See Li Yunshu (李云舒), Quanguo Renda Chutai Jueding Beihou: Yong Fazhi
Gechu Chiyewei Louxi (全国人大出台决定背后:用法治革除吃野味陋习),
CCDI (Feb. 25, 2020, 6:25 AM),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/202002/t20200225_212177.html
[https://perma.cc/8FGH-CWGT] (discussing the rationale behind NPC’s decision
to restrict trade and consumption of wildlife); Liu Weibing, China to prioritize
Legislation on Public Health in 2020, XINHUA (May 26, 2020, 8:28 AM),
http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0526/c90000-9694301.html [https://perma.cc/PBN95VAL] (“[NPC] said it plans to revise the Wildlife Protection Law, the Law on
the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases, the Frontier Health and
Quarantine Law, and the Emergency Response Law in 2020.”); Steven Lee
Myers, China Vowed to Keep Wildlife Off the Menu, a Tough Promise to Keep,
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/world/asia/china-coronavirus-wildlifeban.html [https://perma.cc/CFY5-PVPP] (“China’s legislature, the National
People’s Congress, adjourned its annual session late last month without adopting
new laws that would end the trade.”).
183
James Gorman, China’s Ban on Wildlife Trade a Big Step, but Has Loopholes,
Conservationists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/science/coronavirus-pangolin-wildlife-banchina.html [https://perma.cc/5NPX-9K9S]; Aron White, China’s Wildlife Trade
Policy—Where Are We Now And What Might Come Next?, ENVTL.
INVESTIGATION AGENCY (May 7, 2020), https://eia-international.org/blog/chinaswildlife-trade-policy-where-are-we-now-and-what-might-come-next/
[https://perma.cc/F7ZN-2EJC]. The exception for medical and other non-eating
uses is embodied in the NPC-SC Decision as well. See Decision on Trade in
Wildlife, supra note 180.
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putting regulatory laws into practice in China, 184 rules that might
address the likely sources of COVID-19 and similar epidemics are
particularly difficult to execute because they must tackle such widely
dispersed behavior by so many actors, and restrict activities on which
targeted actors immediately rely for their livelihoods. Pre-COVID19 efforts to regulate broadly analogous phenomena illustrate the
challenges. One example is a mandate to reduce pollution from
small-scale factories, the implementation of which would threaten
significant numbers of jobs in surrounding communities.
Enforcement efforts ultimately turned to what one scholarly account
calls “blunt force” implementation—local officials meeting quotas
through shutting down some factories, while leaving others to operate,
on grounds that bore limited relation to the law’s articulated standards
and showed little concern for advancing the law’s policy goals
efficiently or with attention to procedural propriety. 185 Another
example is rules that sought to end dairy farmers’ malnutritioncausing dilution of milk used for baby formula. In response to those
measures, some of China’s many thousands of small producers added
toxic melamine to their product to fool government-mandated tests
for protein content, which led to tens of thousands of injuries and
several deaths of poisoned infants.186
Similar problems confront regulatory efforts to restrict or
close the wild animal markets that have been the initial pathway for
184

The challenges of sheer scale and multiple levels of government that faced
infectious disease and emergency response laws and regulations extend to this
context as well. As noted earlier, although less pronounced, the coexistence of
tiao and kuai, overlapping or ambiguously allocated authority among specialized
functional bureaucracies and local governments, and the need for cooperation
across units of governance are also present to some degree in the law addressing
trade in wild animals, including for human consumption. See generally Wild
Animal Conservation Law, supra note 176, arts. 7–8 10–19. 25–28, 34–35.
185
Denise Sienli van der Kamp, Blunt Force Regulation and Bureaucratic
Control: Understanding China’s War on Pollution, GOVERNANCE (forthcoming).
186
Jim Yardley & David Barboza, Despite Warnings, China’s Regulators Failed
to Stop Tainted Milk, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 26, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/world/asia/27milk.html
[https://perma.cc/2PPX-DJJ7];
Austin Ramzy & Lin Yang, Tainted-Baby-Milk Scandal in China, TIME (Sep. 16,
2008), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1841535,00.html
[https://perma.cc/HZ59-R5FM]; Céline Marie-Elise Gossner et al., The Melamine
Incident: Implications for International Food and Feed Safety, 117 ENV’T
HEALTH PERSP. 1803 (2009).
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SARS, COVID-19, and other diseases. Measures targeting such
markets also would face additional hurdles because they would seek
to prohibit something popular with many consumers. 187 In such
contexts, effective administrative enforcement and sanctions can be
impossibly costly, as well as unpopular in affected sectors. More
limited measures to reduce the problematic behavior would require
fewer resources, and risk less resistance, but they are likely to be too
weak to effect the necessary changes in behavior. Publicity and
education campaigns are much touted and often tried, but are likely
to fall short of achieving widespread compliance.
Third, reforms could allow mechanisms outside the
administrative state to play greater roles in ameliorating some types
of problems seen in the COVID-19 epidemic. Legal reforms,
including expanded legal rights for non-state actors to expose
emerging problems, or tightened restrictions on state authorities’
discretion to censor and sanction them, could reduce impediments to
early warnings by doctors and others at the front lines of handling
disease outbreaks, and reporting by old and new media. These could
provide effective supplements to, or substitutes for, state channels
and thereby mitigate problems of error, shirking, and concealment by
officials.
A key moment in accelerating the belated response to SARS
had come when surgeon Jiang Yanyong made public, through outside
media, a level of infection far exceeding official accounts.188 When

187

Why ‘Wet Markets’ Persisted in China Despite Disease and Hygiene
Concerns, NPR (Jan. 22, 2020 4:28 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798644707/why-wet-markets-persisted-in-chinadespite-disease-and-hygiene-concerns [https://perma.cc/29KS-4NR9]; Myers,
supra note 182; see also Yang Qifei (杨弃非), SARS Guoqu 17 Nian le,
Weishenme Women Haishi Jiebudiao Yewei? (SARS 过去 17 年了，为什么我们
还是戒不掉野味？), MEIRI JINGJI XINWEN (每日经济新闻) [NAT’L BUS. DAILY]
(Mar. 7, 2020, 1:56 PM), http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2020-0307/1414597.html [https://perma.cc/396E-5SYE] (analyzing why restricting wild
animal markets is so difficult, including reasons such as customer tastes, status
symbol effect, and local and wider economic interests).
188
Mary Ann Benitez, Beijing Doctor Alleges SARS Cases Cover-up in China,
361 LANCET 1357, 1357 (Apr. 19, 2003),
https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140673603130978.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DHE6-GNWG]; Don Weinland, Tale of Two Doctors Reveals
How China Controls the Narrative, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2020),
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the novel coronavirus first emerged in 2019, opportunities for a fast
and effective response were lost when local authorities in Wuhan
silenced medical staff—most notoriously when police warned Dr. Li
and others that communicating information about the disturbing new
pneumonia via social media was unlawful, when hospital officials
warned Dr. Ai—a key source for Li—to keep silent, and when
censors blocked COVID-related posts by Li and others. 189 On the
other hand, in the early days of the novel coronavirus outbreak,
China’s constrained cyberspace informed policy responses in ways
that could not have occurred sixteen years earlier—possibly having
alerted central authorities to the emerging problem in Wuhan (by
leaking the WHC’s previously undisclosed documents) and pushing
local authorities to adopt more effective or less abusive methods to
combat the virus (through a torrent of critical posts by netizens
targeting mayors, municipal party secretaries, and other officials and
institutions).190
Reform advocates long have urged more robust legal
protections for whistleblowers and, a more diffuse public “right to
know,” particularly during public emergencies. 191 Such reforms
would be consistent with, and could be justified as serving, the
principle—long accepted by the party and state—of “people’s
supervision” over political and governmental authority. There are
some foundations for a modest public right to know—or at least the
correlative obligation to inform—in the provisions in emergency
response and infectious disease laws and regulations concerning
public warnings and announcements of measures to address
imminent or occurring epidemics. 192 Reforms in this vein thus could
https://www.ft.com/content/cf59b132-43d7-11ea-a43a-c4b328d9061c
[https://perma.cc/GM34-PTR5].
189
See supra text accompanying note 40.
190
See, e.g., Raymond Zhong, As Virus Spreads, Anger Floods Chinese Social
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/technology/china-coronavirus-censorshipsocial-media.html [https://perma.cc/VBC9-SRWT].
191
See Xiaoling Zhang, Breaking News, Media Coverage and “Citizen’s Right to
Know” in China, 16 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 535, 535 (2007) (“[A]lthough the
Chinese media do not lack the capacity to honor the ‘citizen’s right to know’, the
coverage of breaking news is determined by the state’s perception of a given
situation.”); deLisle, supra note 8, at 386–87.
192
See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 65, 68(5) (imposing legal
responsibility/sanctions on government entities that conceal facts on epidemic
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build on provisions in existing law and policy. In assessing the early
phases of the handling of COVID-19, Chinese authorities implicitly
acknowledged that suppressing warnings from society was improper
and counterproductive: Li—who in the interim had died from
COVID-19—received praise in official media as a hero, posthumous
awards and recognition from party-linked organizations, a revocation
of the Wuhan Public Security Bureau’s admonition, and further
vindication in the form of statements from a CDC official and the
Supreme People’s Court’s social media account that criticized the
behavior of the Wuhan police in stifling Li and others. 193
China’s internet and social media are a promising space for
achieving vital transparency, as the early days of COVID-19
illustrated. For a brief time, Wuhan doctors and their friends
situation or unlawfully fail to perform responsibilities under the law—a category
that includes notifying the public when the laws so require). See also supra the
provisions that address reporting obligations of medical institutions and staff in
note 158.
193
See China Exonerates Doctor Reprimanded for Warning of Virus, AP NEWS
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://apnews.com/6f2e666485e9abae4bb112251eca77be
[https://perma.cc/5UCX-ZSQR] (discussing how China exonerated and
apologized to Li Wenliang after his death); Fact and Fiction About U.S. Lies
Concerning China and the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic, supra note 45
(describing posthumous praise and awards and Wuhan Public Security Bureau
withdrawal of admonitions); Jun Mai, Politics May Have Stalled Information in
Wuhan Coronavirus Crisis, Scientist Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 30,
2020, 8:45 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3048283/politics-may-havestalled-information-wuhan-coronavirus-crisis.[https://perma.cc/CFB6-9S9D]
(quoting Global Times quotation of CDC’s Zeng Guang’s implicit criticism of the
government’s hesitation to inform the public about COVID-19 by stating that the
government needed to consider other “factors” and that scientists were only “part
of their considerations”); Jun Mai, Coronavirus ‘Rumour’ Crackdown by Wuhan
Police Slammed by China’s Top Court, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 29, 2020,
3:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3048042/chinas-topcourt-hits-out-wuhan-police-over-coronavirus-rumour [https://perma.cc/9HC6RQSX] (reporting on how the Supreme People’s Court lashed out at police for
punishing citizens who were accused of “spreading rumours” about COVID-19);
Zhili Youguan Xinxing Feiyan de Yaoyan Wenti, Zhepian Wenzhang Shuo
Qingchu le! (治理有关新型肺炎的谣言问题，这篇文章说清楚了!) [On the
Question of Handling Rumors Related to the Novel Coronavirus, This Article
Speaks Clearly!], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ETgXN6HInzlC8cxzhDdU9g
[https://perma.cc/HT4V-YD7P].
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managed to post reports about the eruption of the virus. Disgruntled
netizens were able to circulate deleted media articles on COVIDrelated issues. Wuhan resident and eminent Chinese author Fang
Fang wrote quickly censored but widely read “diary” posts for her
nearly four million Weibo followers detailing the experiences of
residents and governmental missteps in Wuhan under lockdown—
except for a period in February 2020 when her account was
suspended.194 Conventional media offer another potential avenue, as
the initial weeks of the novel coronavirus showed. Exposés and
journalistic first-draft post-mortems of flawed initial responses to
COVID-19 appeared in Caixin magazine, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao
[China Youth Daily], and other media venues. Amid the pandemic,
some prominent scholars in law and other fields identified a lack of
protections for freedom of the press and freedom of expression as a
cause of the government’s failure to deal with the emerging pandemic
earlier and more effectively.195
Prospects for major changes on these fronts remain modest.
As the experiences of Dr. Li, Fang Fang, and other would-be
informers of the public underscore, social media content and other
citizen statements unwelcomed by authorities can be taken down,
content-providers sanctioned, and prospective voices deterred—in
194

See FANG FANG, supra note 27. See also Hemant Adlakha, Fang Fang: The
‘Conscience of Wuhan’ Amid Coronavirus Quarantine, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 23,
2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/fang-fang-the-conscience-of-wuhanamid-coronavirus-quarantine/ [https://perma.cc/4UNA-K758]; Yuwen Wu,
Chinese Propagandists Don’t Want You to Read This Diary on the Coronavirus
Lockdown in Wuhan, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/coronavirus-wuhan-lockdown-fangfangdiary-china-dr-li-a9368961.html [https://perma.cc/K8EE-BTTQ]; Helen
Davidson, Chinese Writer Faces Online Backlash Over Wuhan Lockdown Diary,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/10/chinese-writer-fang-fang-facesonline-backlash-wuhan-lockdown-diary [https://perma.cc/MY22-HG7Q].
195
Jun Mai & Mimi Lau, Chinese Scholar Blames Xi Jinping, Communist Party
for Not Controlling Coronavirus Outbreak, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 6,
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3049233/chinesescholar-blames-xi-jinping-communist-party-not [https://perma.cc/T6MX-4LWA]
(quoting He Weifang); Mimi Lau, Echo Xie & Guo Rui Coronavirus: Li
Wenliang’s death prompts academics to challenge Beijing on freedom of speech,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050086/coronavirushundreds-chinese-sign-petition-calling-freedom [https://perma.cc/CUW9-DPVJ].
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part pursuant to broad and vague rules that prohibit and punish
spreading rumors.196 As illustrated by the taking down of state-linked
People magazine’s WeChat-posted interview with Ai Fen, state
control and party directives still impose serious—and, in recent years,
tightening—limitations on the media, restricting their ability to report
on emerging crises and governance failures. 197
At the same time, China’s information environment of
controlled and censored institutional media and sometimes-rumorfilled social media can lead audiences to infer that the real situation
well may be more dire than what often-unforthcoming official and
establishment sources reveal. This is all the more likely to be the case
in frightening and fast-moving crises such as COVID-19. 198 Such
public misimpression and mistrust pose additional problems for the
regime’s capacity to respond effectively to COVID-19-like
challenges. This, in turn, suggests that the authorities could be better
able to pursue their own goals in preventing, detecting, and
containing infectious disease outbreaks and public health
emergencies if new and old media faced lesser restrictions.
196

See generally Rogier Creemers, Cyber China: Upgrading Propaganda, Public
Opinion Work and Social Management for the Twenty-First Century, 26 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA 85, 91–93 (2017) (detailing the development of policy against
spreading rumors online that may cause “social panic”); Maria Repnikova,
China’s Lessons for Fighting Fake News, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/chinas-lessons-for-fighting-fake-news/
[https://perma.cc/2Y6X-5CKK] (discussing widespread measures taken by the
Chinese government to crack down on online rumors); Emergency Response
Law, supra note 29, arts. 65, 68 (imposing sanctions, including criminal
punishment, for spreading false information concerning emergency situation or
response).
197
Kuo, supra note 14; Huang, supra note 42. See also 2020 World Press
Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table
[https://perma.cc/PT9K-NE95] (last visited Aug. 14, 2020) (ranking China 177
out of 180 entities in press freedom); Susan L. Shirk, Changing Media, Changing
China, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA 1, 2–3 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011)
(noting that despite increased commercialization of the media in the 1990s,
“China is nonetheless still a long way from having a free press”).
198
Issaku Harada, Surge in Chinese Virus Cases Fuels Public Distrust of Official
Data, NIKKEI: ASIAN REV. (Feb. 14, 2020, 2:05 AM),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Surge-in-Chinese-virus-cases-fuelspublic-distrust-of-official-data [https://perma.cc/H7D4-VXK2]; Daniel Victor,
Panic and Criticism Spread on Chinese Social Media Over Coronavirus, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/world/asia/chinasocial-media-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Z8-WXMF].
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Major changes on these fronts will be difficult to achieve
absent more fundamental and wide-reaching reforms, such as robust
protection for freedom of speech and the press, or tolerance for the
development of a more autonomous civil society. Tellingly, many
months after the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, there still have
been almost no public discussions or published investigations in
China into the origins of the epidemic, despite serious public concern
about such issues and the regime’s handling of it. 199
Finally, reforms could make more permissible and promising
lawsuits by injured or aggrieved citizens that could increase
retrospective accountability for flawed government responses to
crises akin to COVID-19 and, in turn, incentivize officials to avoid
recurrence in future potential crises. In the melamine-tainted milk
scandal, the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake (when several
thousand children died in shoddily constructed school buildings
approved by corrupt or indolent officials), and other large-scale
disasters, victims and their lawyers have sought remedies from
China’s judiciary. These efforts have included both administrative
lawsuits against officials and government entities and mass tort
claims against officials or private defendants in cases that have
involved, and exposed, government failure. 200
199

Some overheated assessments outside China speculated that public concern
and discontent with the initial handling of the outbreak and the lack of
transparency could make COVID-19 the regime’s “Chernobyl moment.” Gary
Shih, In Coronavirus Outbreak, China’s Leaders Scramble to Avert a Chernobyl
Moment, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2020, 7:01 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-coronavirus-outbreakchinas-leaders-scramble-to-avert-a-chernobyl-moment/2020/01/29/bc4eb52a4250-11ea-99c7-1dfd4241a2fe_story.html [https://perma.cc/RJ2B-HK3T];
Liubomir K. Toplaoff, Is COVID-19 China’s “Chernobyl Moment”?, DIPLOMAT
(Mar. 4, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/is-covid-19-chinas-chernobylmoment/ [https://perma.cc/LK9K-74CC]. For a more measured assessment of the
limited negative impact, see Minxin Pei, How Has the Coronavirus Crisis
Affected Xi’s Power: A Preliminary Assessment, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR
(June 1, 2020), https://www.prcleader.org/pei-1 [https://perma.cc/SKB9-UF7H].
But see the sources cited in note 153.
200
Andrew Jacobs & Edward Wong, China Reports Student Toll for Quake, N.Y.
TIMES (May 7, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/world/asia/08china.html
[https://perma.cc/8EDH-JWYK]; China Court Rejects Parents’ Quake Lawsuit,
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When they go forward (and sometimes even when they do
not), such lawsuits can serve a purpose that the regime should
welcome as consistent with its interests in effective governance and
its expressed preferences for rule by law.201 They can enlist harmed
or at-risk citizens to expose malfeasance in governance, and thereby
spotlight needs for corrective measures that can reduce the likelihood
of public health and other emergencies, and the threats they can pose
to the economy, social stability, and the regime’s popular legitimacy.
Yet, here too, prospects for major change appear modest.
Such legal claims sometimes will fail for any number of reasons,
including courts’ refusal to adjudicate the cases on their own initiative
or under directives or pressure from political authorities at various
levels. The melamine milk, Wenchuan earthquake, and kindred
public health and safety crises have spawned lawsuits, but they rarely
get very far in court. Early attempts to bring COVID-19 suits seem
very unlikely to fare better.202 State-brokered compensation schemes
sometimes have followed for groups of victims, but, absent
significant and effective reforms expanding court access and judicial
remedies, potential plaintiffs often will be deterred by slim chances
for success or concerns about retaliation by targeted officials. Class
action suits, a vibrant cadre of crusading mass tort lawyers, and
doctrinally innovative pro-victim courts have played major roles in
fostering legal means for promoting accountability for regulatory
rejects-parents-quake-lawsuit/#.X1zOeGhKhPY [https://perma.cc/DZ99-QEFY];
Tainted Milk Lawsuit Rejected, PBS (Dec. 9, 2008),
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/tainted-milk-lawsuitrejected/3780/ [https://perma.cc/7U54-UEWQ]; Edward Wong, Milk Scandal in
China Yields Cash for Parents, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/17/world/asia/17milk.html
[https://perma.cc/6GC5-2KUM]. See also Shahla F. Ali, Mass-Claims Mediation
in China, 10 J. COMP. L. 142, 142–43 (2015) (describing limits to lawsuits as a
vehicle for redress in mass disasters in China, including earthquake, melamine,
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failure—and, in turn—recurrence-reducing reforms in some
countries, but such “bottom-up” forces for law-driven change have
not been present in China, and they are not likely to emerge in the
near future.203

CONCLUSION: COVID-19 AS A CASE STUDY OF
CHINA’S GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY STATE
China’s response to the challenges of COVID-19 offers a case
study of law, the regulatory state and governance in China. The initial,
troubled response to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan
improved upon the early handling of the SARS crisis in 2003, in part
reflecting the partial success of legal and regulatory reforms adopted
to implement the lessons of SARS. At the same time, the damaging
delays in reporting and responding to COVID-19 reflected not only
shortcomings in those reforms but also, and more importantly,
distinctive and enduring features of the system, including: the
coexistence of, and tensions between, kuai-based approaches that
give power and responsibility to local-level governments, and tiaobased approaches that assign key roles to centralized, functionally
specialized bureaucracies; the perverse incentives local-level
officials face to try to cover up potentially serious emerging problems,
which ultimately can make the consequences far worse; the
fragmentation of institutions that stems from officials’ strong
identification with their particular units and the relative weakness of
some vital systems (such as the national public health bureaucracy)
and that results in collectively ambiguous rules emanating from
multiple sources and daunting challenges of coordinating among
siloed entities to achieve coherent government action (especially
203
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Lawyering, 59 CHINA J. 111, 126 (2008) (noting the limited prospects for impact
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where the necessary measures could imperil traditionally higherpriority policy goals).
After these initial shortcomings, China’s largely successful,
centrally mandated efforts to contain the pandemic, and prevent its
recurrence, also reflected defining and durable features of the Chinese
systems of law, regulation, and governance. The response relied
significantly, but only partly, on law-based means. It showed a highly
capable, centralized and authoritarian party-state that could: mobilize
vast governmental and societal resources; overcome challenges of
steering fragmented and sprawling institutions; deploy a repertoire
that included high-profile directions from top-level leaders, new ad
hoc government and party coordinating bodies, informal political
exhortations, and a formidable array of long-standing low-tech and
newer high-tech mechanisms for monitoring and controlling citizens’
actions; and operate free from much constraint by quasi-federalist
powers of local governments, autonomy or privacy rights of
individuals, or popular resistance and public protest.
Finally, prospects for post-COVID reforms, too, illustrate
characteristic features of Chinese law, regulation, and governance.
Post-COVID measures are likely to follow a typical pattern of
adopting legal reforms to address the perceived sources of past
shortcomings, such as structural and procedural problems of
regulation that seem to have led to an initial slow response and locallevel cover-up (in the case of the Wuhan outbreak), and tightening
regulation of underlying sources of the problem (trade in wild animals,
in the case of the novel coronavirus). But such reform measures will
face familiar and pervasive impediments: the compelling appeal and
stubborn entrenchment of both the kuai and tiao approaches (despite
their problematic interactions); the pervasive difficulty of
implementing ambitious policies (especially where they target largescale, dispersed, and valued behavior); and a persisting reluctance to
adopt more transformative laws or policies that would protect
whistleblowers, allow freer traditional and new media, accept a
public “right to know,” or permit accountability-promoting civil or
administrative lawsuits by victims of regulatory failure.
To acknowledge these limits to prospective legal reforms—
and to the roles of law in China’s response to crises and means for
managing crises—is not, however, a counsel of despair. Past legal
reforms have achieved some success. More reforms are likely in the
aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis. And, for good and for ill, the tools
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of regulation and the roles of law in China have proved susceptible to
significant, and sometimes relatively sudden and dramatic, change.

